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MANUAL FOR
LOCAL DEFENSE
HENRY A. BELLOWS



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MANUAL FOR LOCAL DEFENSE



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
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
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**The Hollow Square and Machine Guns: Defensive (and consequently weak)
Mob Tactics**

MANUAL FOR LOCAL DEFENSE

BY

HENRY A. BELLOWS

MAJOR, 13TH BATTALION, MINNESOTA HOME GUARD

New York

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1918

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To

COLONEL PERRY HARRISON
AND THE MEN OF THE
13TH BATTALION, M. H. G.

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In the preparation of this manual, the writer has been particularly indebted to Major James A. Moss's "Riot Duty," the most valuable published work on the subject; to Chief Inspector Dillon and Inspector Myers, of the New York City Police Department, for their very helpful advice and coöperation; to Lieutenant-Colonel R. I. Rees, now of the General Staff, for his assistance and counsel regarding organization; to Mr. W. C. Nichols, formerly of the Northwest Mounted Police, for many useful suggestions; and to the officers of the 13th Battalion, Minnesota Home Guard, and above all to Captain L. H. Brittin, for unfailing assistance in the practical working out of the principles herein discussed.

MANUAL FOR LOCAL DEFENSE

MANUAL FOR LOCAL DEFENSE

I

THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL DEFENSE

1. **The Local Defense Unit.**—Along with the recent enormous growth of the United States Regular Army, the war has involved the creation all over the country of semi-military units formed for local defense. Many of these units have been organized as National Guard regiments under the provisions of Militia Bureau Circular Letter No. 3, of March 27, 1918, or as Home Guards under state laws, to replace the former National Guard, while others have been established under county or municipal authority to supplement the regular and permanent forces of the local police. Whatever the status of these local defense units, they all have certain characteristics in common. They are all composed largely, if not entirely, of volunteers who retain their business or professional activities, and who are prepared to serve, within well-defined geographical limits, either without any compensation whatever or at a nominal pay. Their mission is primarily preventive; they exist to prevent disorder from starting, or from reaching any serious magnitude, rather than to quell disturbances which have already passed beyond the control of

the civil authorities. They are all backed by some form of legal authority, whether state, county or municipal. These three points may be accepted as fundamental.

2. The Unit as a Training School.—In many cases these semi-military organizations have a twofold function: not only do they aim to preserve peace and order in their communities, but they serve as military training schools for men who, though not yet in federal service, are eager to be as well prepared as possible when the call reaches them. Many men who are now noncommissioned officers in the National Army owe their rapid promotion to the fact that, before they were drafted into federal service, they had learned the fundamentals of military discipline in one of these local defense units. Thousands of men over or under the present draft age are now similarly preparing for the time when the government may demand their services. Military training of any sort has been so rare in this country that, in the present great emergency, every opportunity to “learn the game” is of immense value.

3. Importance of the Work.—There can be no question whatsoever that, in fulfilling their double function of local defense and military training, these semi-military organizations are rendering the country a very important service. Domestic conditions are such that practically every community is acutely conscious of the need of some trained and organized body which can, in an emergency, supplement the regular forces of the police. Industrial disturbances have been accentuated by war-time economic conditions; sabotage of one sort and another is not in-

frequent; above all, there is the constant menace of that element, of still unknown size and strength, which is definitely and actively opposed to the nation's course in the war, and which has allied to itself the scattered but dangerous group which is deliberately working in behalf of the common enemy. The existence of a trained body of men, known to be ready for an emergency, is in itself a vast protection against lawlessness on any extensive scale. Furthermore, the duration of the war, and the conditions which will exist at its close, as yet defy guesswork; all we know surely is that the United States has suddenly found itself in armed competition with nations in which military training has long been compulsory and universal. For the present the national government can do no more than raise, organize, train, equip and maintain the actual fighting army; the building up of a national reserve, from which future first-line troops can at need be drawn, must be left largely to local initiative. Experience has shown that men will not respond largely to a call for mere drill, unless the element of local defense be added. It is safe to say that several hundred thousand men are today receiving in local defense units training which, if the war continues another year and a half, will immensely expedite the work of whipping the new national armies into shape.

4. **Lack of a Manual.**—One handicap has been particularly apparent in the training and organization of these forces for local defense. No manual has been formulated for the guidance of the officers, and the existing Army manuals, designed as they are for an

essentially different purpose, manifestly fail to meet the needs of the situation. The local defense unit is first of all an emergency police force, and it will normally be used under conditions wherein it would be improper or undesirable to call out regular troops. Its weapons, its organization and its tactics ought to be unlike those of the Army, because its mission is fundamentally different. Specifically, there is no excuse for using loaded rifles or bayonets in dispersing a disorderly, but not riotous, crowd; unloaded rifles without bayonets are an unpardonable form of "bluff," and thus the local defense officer who is searching the Army manuals for guidance in handling such a situation finds little that is properly applicable thereto.

5. The Preventive Mission.—Various military textbooks have admirable chapters regarding street riot duty, and a few excellent books on the subject have been published. All of these, however, are open to the same objection: the mission on which their instructions are based is that of suppression, not of prevention. They concern riots which have already reached such proportions that the civil authorities have appealed to the military to assume the burden. The very recently published "Police Reserve and Home Defense Guard Manual," by Major Dawkins and Inspector Cahalane, is curiously devoid of information regarding any form of riot service. The mission of the local defense unit is to prevent disorder from ever reaching that stage. This fundamental dissimilarity in mission must never be forgotten, for it explains why the local defense unit is often seriously

handicapped by attempting to employ tactics which are entirely proper for regular troops.

6. **Aim of this Manual.**—Any definitive military manual is necessarily an outgrowth of long and collective experience; and the local defense unit in the United States is so new, and its duties are so largely the product of conditions that did not exist a year ago, that no final formulation of rules for its guidance is at present possible. The purpose of this book is rather to suggest than to formulate. It aims to make clear the principles underlying the organization and tactical work of all types of local defense units, and to suggest a specific program by which these principles can be applied. From its very nature, much of the tactical detail is still in an experimental state, and the writer will be grateful for any suggestions which the experiences of others engaged in this form of military activity may lead them to make.

II

ORGANIZATION

7. **Military Basis.**—Any volunteer unit, whatever its size, formed for the purpose of local defense should be organized on a military basis, and essentially in accordance with the rules laid down in Army manuals. Only through a formal military organization can the proper degree of discipline and coördination be secured, and in no other way can the unit fulfill its second function, that of giving its members training in the fundamentals of military service. In the case of National Guard units this matter is, of course, automatically taken care of, but local defense organizations range all the way down to bodies of special police, and in many cases the military quality is conspicuously absent.

8. **Success Depends on Discipline.**—In the event of actual service, it is probable that any local defense unit will find itself greatly outnumbered. Unless the situation is so serious as to warrant the use of rifles, bayonets or shotguns, the effectiveness of the unit will depend absolutely on its discipline: the precision and rapidity with which its component parts can be maneuvered according to the will of the commanding officer. For this reason, if for no other, the formal military organization is essential.

9. **Number of Men.**—The number of men to be enrolled in any local defense unit is, of course, entirely dependent on the size and nature of the community in which it is maintained. In general, the area to be covered makes less difference than the character and density of the population, for an efficient unit is capable of rapid transportation. A small and effective unit is very much better than a large and loosely knit one. For this reason, no man should be carried on the rolls who (a) is not physically fit to withstand a considerable amount of fatigue and exposure to cold or wet weather; (b) who does not, for any reason whatsoever, report for drill with regularity; (c) whose business is such that he cannot possibly leave it altogether, in an emergency, for several days together. These provisions, if strictly adhered to, will combine to limit the numerical strength of any local defense unit, and within these limits it is desirable to carry on recruiting as actively as possible.

10. **Physical Examination.**—Before any man is enrolled, he should receive a thorough physical examination. It is unnecessary to maintain the Army standard, but no man should be permitted to enroll whose health, in the judgment of the medical examiner, would be endangered by the fatigue and exposure necessarily incident to emergency service. The physical examination should be repeated at stated intervals, and should be prescribed for all officers and men. The physical examination makes it undesirable to prescribe an arbitrary maximum age limit for men enrolling in any local defense unit. Men of draft age should be particularly urged

to enroll, in order that they may receive as much military training as possible before they are called to the colors. The physical examination will automatically, and without hard feeling, dispose of the cases of most of the much older men who may wish to enroll. Boys under eighteen or nineteen should not, as a general rule, be accepted.

11. Character Important.—Officers should exercise great care in determining the character of any applicant for enrollment, proceeding much as they would do in the case of an applicant for a permanent and responsible business position. Any member of a local defense unit may find himself vested with full police powers, and there is almost unlimited opportunity for the wrong man to make trouble. Letters of recommendation should be required of applicants unknown to any of the officers.

12. Oath of Enlistment.—Whatever the form of the local defense unit may be, every member should, upon enrollment, be required to sign some form of oath, promise or agreement. It is desirable that this should be an oath administered by the civil authority—state, county or municipal—from which the unit derives its power to act. If the term of enlistment is specified, provision should be made whereby an honorable discharge can be secured, for good cause, before the term is completed. The oath, promise or agreement should be sufficiently explicit to make clear the nature and extent of all the major obligations it entails.

13. Information Blanks.—At the time of enrollment, each man should fill out, in duplicate, a form providing

for the following information: Date, name, age, place of birth, height, weight, color of eyes and hair, complexion, name of person to be notified in case of emergency, home address and telephone number, business or profession, business address and telephone number, married or single, make, kind and seating capacity of automobile (if any), make and calibre of rifle, shotgun and pistol or revolver (if any), previous military experience (if any). Spaces should be left on these forms for the man's company letter and squad number, his ordnance number, car number (see Paragraph 22), the report of the medical examiner, and such further information as his company commander may wish to incorporate therewith. If the local defense unit has the strength of merely one company, one of these duplicate forms should be retained by the company commander, the other by the first sergeant; if it is a battalion or a regiment, the second form should be forwarded to the adjutant. Even when regular state enlistment papers are made out, the above information concerning every enlisted man should be in the possession of his company, battalion and regimental commanders from the very beginning of his service.

14. Equipment Form.—It is desirable that each man, at the time of enrollment, should likewise fill out a form giving his height, weight, chest and waist measure, size of hat, gloves and shoes. This form will be retained by the company supply sergeant, for use in making up his reports regarding requirements for uniforms.

15. Size of the Company.—Any local defense unit with less than 100 men should be organized as a single com-

pany, unless geographical conditions are such as to make two companies absolutely imperative. In general, the large company is very much more effective as a basis of organization than the small one. Many local defense units suffer from an overabundance of officers, resulting from the small size of the companies. Tactically, the large company can do anything of which the smaller one is capable, and at the same time is far more effective as a fighting unit than the same number of men split into two or more companies. For large organizations, the sixteen-squad company, with from 150 to 160 officers and men, is the most satisfactory basis. On this the battalion or regiment can be built up according to Army regulations.

NOTE. The general tendency in local defense organizations at present seems to be to keep the companies relatively small. This is partly because many of the officers have been trained in the old National Guard companies of 60 to 100 men, partly because the small company is much easier for an inexperienced or rusty officer to handle, and partly because of the desire to provide commissions for a considerable number of men. It is also claimed that the division into small companies provides a larger number of units capable of operating independently. To this it may be answered that a well-drilled platoon or half company, commanded by a competent lieutenant, and with the proper number of noncommissioned officers, is just as effective when operating independently as it would be if it were

organized as a company, while, owing to the centralized command, a single company of 160 men is far more effective as a unit than two companies of 80 men working together. This point will be further brought out in the discussion of tactics for local defense organizations.

16. Basis for Company Organization.—The following is suggested as a basis for company organization: one captain; one first lieutenant; one second lieutenant; one first sergeant; one supply sergeant; one mess sergeant; one hospital sergeant, attached; nine duty sergeants (one commander third platoon, eight section commanders); 17 squad leaders (16 assigned to squads, one company clerk); 120 privates (112 assigned to 16 squads, 8 file-closers); two mechanics; one hospital orderly, attached; two musicians. Total, three officers, 155 enlisted men.

17. The Battalion.—If the number of companies is two, three, four or five, the unit should be organized as a battalion. It is often advisable to effect a battalion organization for companies formed separately in adjacent towns. The battalion field and staff should consist of a major, an adjutant, a supply officer, a surgeon, an ordnance officer, a sergeant major, a supply sergeant, an ordnance sergeant and a hospital sergeant. If a band or drum corps can be organized and attached to the Headquarters Company, under the command of the Adjutant, so much the better. If possible, the Surgeon should organize an Ambulance Company, formed for instruction and drill independently of the line companies, and

capable of acting either as a unit, when the battalion is operating as a whole, or of splitting into several parts, each under one of the hospital sergeants attached to the companies, in case the companies are called on to work independently, or in widely separated districts. At least two clerks and four orderlies, who may under normal circumstances drill with their respective companies, should be detailed for staff duty on active service, and should receive special training for this work. The fact that, under ordinary conditions, some of the staff officers and noncommissioned officers may find relatively little to do in no way lessens the importance of having them definitely assigned. All administrative duties affecting more than a single company should be carefully mapped out, and each staff officer should thoroughly familiarize himself with his actual or possible duties, taking into account every contingency which can be foreseen.

18. Larger Units.—If the unit consists of more than five companies, and less than fourteen, it should be organized as a regiment of two or three battalions. The field and staff officers should be assigned according to Army regulations. Units of fourteen or more companies should be brigaded. In general, such large units will exist only where a single military organization is formed to cover a wide territory, such as that of an entire state. In this case, separate towns will maintain their own companies or battalions, which will seldom operate together. Under such circumstances, in addition to the regimental or brigade staff, each separate battalion should have its own staff, organized as in Paragraph 17.

19. **System of Mobilization.**—The most important single feature of any local defense unit, particularly in the city, is its system of mobilization. Trouble often starts very suddenly, and sometimes without warning, and the success of the organization in coping with it depends, above all else, on its ability to get its men together quickly at the scene of disorder. "Getting there first" is nine-tenths of the battle, and an organization which has once demonstrated its ability to take the field, fully equipped and ready for service, at very short notice has gone a long way toward maintaining order thereafter in its community.

20. **Telephone and Automobile.**—The telephone and the automobile supply the normal machinery for mobilizing the local defense unit. Whatever the size of the whole unit, the company is the basis for mobilization; in the larger units the order to mobilize, with instructions as to the situation and the immediate steps to be taken, will proceed from the commanding officer to the company commanders. It is their duty to have their system of notification and transportation always accurate and effective. These systems will, of course, vary according to local conditions, but certain general principles will apply in nearly every case.

21. **Notification.**—The problem of mobilization is twofold: first, the men must be notified; second, they must be transported to the chosen mobilization point. The notification by telephone is best handled through the regular company organization: the captain notifies the lieutenants and the first sergeant; each one of them

notifies four of the sergeants, who in turn pass on the order to the squad leaders and privates. The list should be so arranged that no man has to telephone to more than four other men, or less than two. Full provision must be made for possible failure to locate immediately any man responsible for the transmission of an order; such failure must in no case be permitted to break the chain of communication, and at least two substitutes for each man thus responsible should be clearly designated.

22. Printed Roster.—It is advisable to have the full roster of the company printed, and two copies (one for the office and one for the home) issued to each man. Corrections may be made by weekly or bimonthly bulletins, or, though less satisfactorily, by announcements at drill. The printed roster should give full details of the systems of notification and transportation. Each officer and enlisted man should have a notification number, and also a car number (see Paragraph 26). The roster will then be printed in the following form:

No.	Name	Rank	Address (Home and Office)	Telephone (Home and Office)	Car No.
1	Smith, J. A.	Captain	97 Hillside Ave. 162 Main St.	West 3894 Main 4526	24
2	Brown, R. E.	1st Lt.	437 Green St. 88 Fourth St.	South 8423 Center 695	31
3	Jones, L. F.	2nd Lt.	182 25th St. 932 First National Bank Building	West 4737 Main 827	16

23. Form for Notification System.—On page 16 appears the outline of a notification system, based on

a printed roster such as the foregoing, for a company of 3 officers and 155 enlisted men (as described in Paragraph 16). With the coöperation of the telephone company, which should be arranged for in advance, it should be possible to notify every man in such a company who is not actually out of reach of a telephone within 40 minutes of the time when the company commander receives the initial call.

24. Alternative Notification Systems.—The telephone will provide adequately for notification under most circumstances, but an alternative plan should be arranged in case anything should happen to interfere with or destroy the telephone service. A specified fire signal, or the bugle call "Assembly" played on municipal or church chimes, may be used as a summons to immediate mobilization. Furthermore, men with automobiles should be prepared to use the company transportation system (see Paragraphs 25 and 26) for purposes of notification, in case no more expeditious method is available.

1 (Capt.)	2 (1st Lt.)	5 (Serg.)	17 (S. L.)	53, 54, 55
			18 (S. L.)	56, 57, 58
			19 (S. L.)	59, 60, 61
		6 (Serg.)	20 (S. L.)	62, 63, 64
	21 (S. L.)		65, 66, 67	
	22 (S. L.)		68, 69, 70	
	7 (Serg.)	23 (S. L.)	71, 72, 73	
		24 (S. L.)	74, 75, 76	
		25 (S. L.)	77, 78, 79	
	8 (Serg.)	26 (S. L.)	80, 81, 82	
		27 (S. L.)	83, 84, 85	
		28 (S. L.)	86, 87, 88	
	9 (Serg.)	29 (S. L.)	89, 90, 91	
		30 (S. L.)	92, 93, 94	
		31 (S. L.)	95, 96, 97	
	10 (Serg.)	32 (S. L.)	98, 99, 100	
33 (Clk.)		101, 102, 103		
34		104, 105, 106		
11 (Serg.)	35	107, 108, 109		
	36	110, 111, 112		
	37	113, 114, 115		
12 (Serg.)	38	116, 117, 118		
	39	119, 120, 121		
	40	122, 123, 124		
13 (Serg.)	41	125, 126, 127		
	42	128, 129, 130		
	43	131, 132, 133		
14 (Serg.) (Mess)	44	134, 135, 136		
	45	137, 138, 139		
	46	140, 141, 142		
15 (Serg.) (Supply)	47	143, 144, 145		
	48	146, 147, 148		
	49	149, 150, 151		
16 (Serg.) (Hosp.)	50 (H. O.)	152, 153, 154		
	51	155 (Mech.), 156 (Mech.)		
	52	157 (Mus.), 158 (Mus.)		

OUTLINE OF NOTIFICATION SYSTEM BY TELEPHONE FOR
A COMPANY OF THREE OFFICERS AND ONE HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE ENLISTED MEN

The notification numbers should be so assigned that, as far as possible, home calls will be within a single telephone exchange (e. g., the house telephones of Nos. 5, 17, 18, 19, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 should all be listed under one exchange).

25. Reaching Mobilization Point.—The system employed for transporting the men of each company to the mobilization point must be fitted to local conditions. Either of two general methods may be adopted: (a) mobilization at one or more fixed points, determined upon as part of the permanent scheme of mobilization; (b) mobilization at or near the immediate scene of action. The first plan has the advantages of permanence and of bringing the company together before it approaches the area of disorder; it has the disadvantage of involving serious delay, and also of being so readily apparent that there is little chance of taking the trouble-makers by surprise. Rapidity of mobilization is so important that the second system, provided it can be worked out with reasonable security, is on the whole preferable. It is, however, frequently possible to combine the two methods by having groups of men who live near each other mobilize at some convenient point, such as a public garage, and proceed thence as a unit to the point of general mobilization designated by the company commander.

26. Use of Automobiles.—Automobiles or motor trucks should, whenever possible, be used for mobilization instead of public conveyances. By utilizing cars belonging to members of the company, and supplementing these by arrangement with owners of public garages, it should be possible to provide one car for every five or six men, or a truck for each group of fifteen or twenty. Each man will then be assigned to an automobile or truck, by number, and will furthermore be directed what to do in case the car to which he is assigned is for any reason not available.

EXAMPLE. Private Robinson, No. 43, receives from Sergeant Hill, No. 13, the order for the company to mobilize at once at the City Water Works. He immediately telephones the order to privates White, Jackson and Reed, Nos. 131, 132 and 133. Reed is not at home, so Robinson gives the message to Mrs. Reed, asking her to locate and notify her husband as soon as possible. Robinson's car number is 17, the automobile in question belonging to his squad leader, Corporal Johnson, and being kept at his garage around the corner. Robinson, therefore, hurries into his uniform, takes his arms, ammunition and such equipment as the mobilization order may have specified, and runs to Corporal Johnson's garage, where the five men assigned to car 17, all of whom live near by, are assembling. If Robinson has been delayed, and Corporal Johnson's automobile has already left, he goes on to the public garage three blocks away, where he knows that a

motor truck will be in waiting for such late comers as himself.

27. Testing the Mobilization System.—It is impossible to lay too much emphasis on the importance of maintaining the mobilization system at the maximum of efficiency; it may, indeed, fairly be called a matter of life and death. Rapid mobilization may at any time mean that a potentially destructive mob, the suppression of which might cost many lives, can be dispersed without bloodshed during the period when it is still nothing more than a disorderly crowd. In all local defense units the mobilization system should be frequently tested, and in all units larger than a single company competitions among the companies should be occasionally held, with a common mobilization point, victory going to the company which has the largest number of men, fully uniformed, armed and equipped for service, at the designated point within a specified time after the call is first issued.

28. Equipment Kept at Home.—Unless an armory is used as a permanent mobilization point—an arrangement open to the objections stated in Paragraph 25—it is desirable that each man should keep his uniform, arms and equipment at home. The nature of the arms normally employed (see Paragraphs 43–49) makes this arrangement easy, and it greatly expedites mobilization, particularly at night, when sudden and urgent calls are most likely to come. In the daytime, throughout any period in which trouble is even remotely expected, it is well for every man to wear his uniform, and to take his arms and equipment with him to his office. In this way

mobilization can be effected at any hour of the day or night with the minimum of delay.

29. Permanent Mobilization Point.—If a permanent mobilization point is used, it should be reasonably central in location, easy of access, and capable of being effectively defended. It should, if possible, provide shelter and safe protection for automobiles. A company mobilized at such a point should be transported to the vicinity of the scene of action in motor trucks, if the distance is not too great and enough trucks are available. The tactical features of such a movement will be considered under the head of TACTICS (Paragraphs 135-137 and 153-157).

30. Squad Organization.—The success of the mobilization system depends largely on the accuracy of the company roster. The personnel of any local defense unit is bound to change materially from month to month, and one of the hardest tasks of the officers will be to keep close track of all the men, and know just how many can be counted on at any given time. The squad organization should be made the fullest possible use of, and each squad leader should be made to feel responsible for the discipline, smartness, instruction and dependability of his squad. Competitive drills among the squads will do much to develop a spirit of the right kind of rivalry. The squad organization should be permanent, so that each squad leader will always be responsible for the same seven men, even if, for drill purposes, it is frequently necessary to break up some of the squads. In this way the squad leader can keep accurate track of his

men, finding out by telephone if any of them are sick or out of town, and seeing that trivial excuses do not suffice to keep the less energetic ones away from drill. Unless the squad is thus made an administrative unit, the company commander is likely to find himself quite unable to keep track of all his men.

31. Regular Attendance at Drills.—Whatever the form of oath or agreement of enlistment, regular attendance at drills should be absolutely insisted on. For this reason, and in view of the quality of the personnel of most local defense units, it is better to have too few prescribed drills than too many. One or two drills a week will maintain the efficiency of the unit, particularly if supplemented by officers' and noncommissioned officers' schools; one drill fully attended is worth two with a 60 or 70 per cent attendance. Attendance records should be kept with absolute accuracy. In a large company the first sergeant should not attempt to call the roll, but should call for reports from the squad leaders. These reports should always be given orally, according to the prescribed form, the name of every absentee being reported. The squad leader should not be permitted to use the formula "All present or accounted for." This system of oral reports gives the squad leaders a further incentive to maintaining the full and regular attendance of the men in their squads. Men absent from prescribed drills should be required to render to their squad leaders (or to the first sergeant in the case of absentee noncommissioned officers) written explanations of the cause of absence. Failure to do so should be regarded as a viola-

tion of the oath or agreement of enlistment. Reasonable excuses should, of course, be accepted; the nature of the local defense unit is such that due allowance must be made for pressing business or other engagements. Men who are frequently absent, however, and all men who fail to make the required reports concerning absences, should unhesitatingly be dropped from the rolls for the good of the service, for otherwise the unit will find its strength seriously impaired in an emergency.

32. Company Paperwork.—While the administrative detail and paperwork of a local defense unit may properly be far less than would be necessary for an Army unit of the same size, the danger is that there will be too little of it rather than too much. Each company should maintain a correspondence book and document file, together with card lists of all the men enrolled (see Paragraph 13) and of all the equipment on hand or issued. It should, furthermore, have printed forms for the morning report and for orders issued by the company commander. The printed roster should be constantly corrected through bulletins (see Paragraph 22), which should be issued on a printed form. Carbon copies of all orders, memoranda and bulletins should be kept on file. If no room in an armory or other public building is available for the purpose, the business office of the company commander, or some other convenient and accessible place, should be designated as the company office.

33. Headquarters Paperwork.—At the headquarters of the local defense battalion or regiment should be kept an accurate roster (preferably in card form) of all officers

and enlisted men in the unit, a full record of all arms, uniforms, supplies and equipment ordered, on hand or issued, a file of all orders received or issued by the commanding officer, printed blanks for consolidated morning reports, orders, requisitions, etc., a correspondence book and a document file. A detailed report should be required from each company after each drill, showing (a) the names of absentees without satisfactory written explanation; (b) the names of absentees with satisfactory written explanation; (c) the names of applicants for enrollment (in case the companies recruit individually); (d) requests for discharges for men who, for any reason, are to be dropped from the rolls; (e) any arms, uniforms, supplies or equipment forming part of the battalion or regimental issue required by the company. Further headquarters equipment is described in Paragraphs 66 and 67.

34. **Noncommissioned Officers' Schools.**—In addition to the prescribed drills, schools should be maintained for the noncommissioned officers. This is a matter of very great importance, for in most local defense units the majority of the noncommissioned officers are either inexperienced or rusty. No noncommissioned officer can hope to retain the respect of his men, or to lead them effectively on active service, unless he knows his business, and no company officers, however efficient they may be, can build up a good company with ill-trained squad leaders and sergeants. The course of study in the noncommissioned officers' school should be carefully mapped out, and the work should be thoroughly supervised by the field, staff and company officers. Sergeants and

squad leaders should be made to understand that their retention of their grades depends primarily on their willingness to work.

35. Officers' Meetings.—The officers of a local defense unit should hold frequent meetings, preferably on a fixed day each week. A part of each meeting should be devoted to officers' school, conducted by the commanding officer, with frequent talks by officers of the regular Army, foreign officers, civilians particularly familiar with the local conditions under which the unit may be called upon to operate, and others whose experience will be of value to the organization. The company officers should use these meetings as opportunities to exchange ideas regarding the handling of their companies, and particular attention should be paid to such administrative and tactical matters as differ from the prescribed Army methods. While the commanding officer of a local defense battalion or regiment should require uniformity of method in all essentials, he should permit sufficient freedom of action to his subordinates so that really useful ideas can be worked out, especially in fields to which the official Army manuals do not fully apply.

36. Keeping the Drill Interesting.—Every effort should be made to keep the work always interesting to officers and enlisted men alike. Many of them have no idea of ever becoming professional soldiers, and their enthusiasm will soon flag over an unvaried course of *Squads Right* and *Squads Left*. The company commander should aim to teach his men something new at each drill. Among the subjects which may be thus taken up, in addition to

the usual routine of close order drill, may be suggested the following: arm signals; two-arm semaphore code; mechanism of the rifle, revolver and pistol; aiming and position drill; bayonet manual (new style); interior guard duty and guard mount; first aid; military sanitation and hygiene; map reading and map making; outpost duty; military reports; inspections; applied problems in minor tactics; military customs, honors and courtesies; special formations and tactics for riot service. The last-named subject is capable of almost limitless development, for every street corner, alley, freight yard, warehouse or factory provides new problems for solution, and when the drill is held actually on the ground—which should be done whenever possible—the men are encouraged to use their own wits in solving the problems set before them.

37. **Promotion.**—The system of assignment to grades and of promotion will be determined largely by the civil authority which controls the local defense unit. In general, however, the election of officers and noncommissioned officers should be avoided, unless it is coupled with a rigid system of examinations. No matter what the status of the local defense unit, no promotion should be made until the candidate has passed a satisfactory examination before a properly constituted examining board. Company commanders should hold examinations, preferably competitive, before making recommendations for the issuing of warrants to noncommissioned officers. All examinations should include, whenever practicable, a demonstration of the candidate's ability to command a unit of the size appropriate to the grade or rank to

which he aspires. In case officers or noncommissioned officers have been appointed without examination, it is none the less desirable to adopt the examination system for subsequent appointments and promotions, and to require the officers previously appointed to take the examinations appropriate to their respective grades. Formal warrants should be issued by the commanding officer of the unit.

38. Quarters for Drill.—In most of the larger cities an armory formerly used by the National Guard is available for the use of the local defense unit. This not only provides a place where rifles and ammunition (except as outlined in Paragraph 45) may be kept, and where drills may be held in cold or stormy weather, but provides also a definite location for the headquarters of the unit, and, in many cases, for the company offices. If an armory is not available, any large hall may be used for drill. It is, of course, desirable that the hall should be large enough to permit of company drill, but this is not absolutely essential, for the proper place to drill is out of doors. Even when the weather is cold or rainy, it is unwise to keep the men too much indoors, provided they are properly equipped. They cannot expect to regulate their periods of active service according to the weather, and the sooner they get used to working together under unfavorable conditions, the more effective the unit will be. Cramped drill quarters are an inconvenience, but nothing worse; if a hall can be secured which is large enough to form a company in, and to drill recruits, the company commander can, by a little ingenuity, adapt

his drill to the conditions, and spend the greater part of his time in the open air, where he belongs.

39. Rifle and Pistol Ranges.—When an armory is available, the problem of galleries for pistol and rifle practice is solved, though it may not always be possible to secure rifles and ammunition suitable for gallery work. Without an armory this difficulty is very much greater. It is absolutely essential that every man equipped with a rifle, shotgun, pistol or revolver should have a considerable amount of practice in the use of it. In many cities arrangements can be made with rifle clubs whereby their galleries may be rented. With the distribution of fire-arms provided for in Paragraphs 43–47, it is reasonable to suppose that all the men assigned to the rifle and shotgun squads will be familiar with the use of their weapons, and that they can find suitable places for occasional practice. The main need is for a pistol gallery, since every officer and enlisted man in the local defense unit should own and carry on active service a pistol or revolver. Such a gallery can often be extemporized in a well-lighted cellar, where a range of 50 or 75 feet can be secured. If the unit is equipped with Army rifles and service ammunition issued by the state or federal government, no practice with this equipment should under any circumstances be permitted except on a regular range authorized by the government for rifle shooting.

40. Headquarters Office.—When an armory is not available, or in case the armory is not equipped with offices, an office should be secured which can be devoted *exclusively* to the purposes of the local defense unit.

A permanent office for headquarters, no matter how small it may be, should be regarded as absolutely essential. The equipment of this office is considered in Paragraphs 66-67.

41. **Organization Adapted to Conditions.**—There are many details concerning the organization of a local defense unit which defy generalization, and must be wholly determined by local conditions. It must not be assumed, however, that the fact that such a unit has been organized on a more or less faulty basis is necessarily a bar to success. The authorities and the officers in charge should not hesitate at any time to revise their whole scheme of organization if by so doing they can render the unit more efficient. The men have presumably joined in order to be of service to their community, and will, as a rule, welcome any change which strengthens the organization, even if in the process they find themselves reduced from lieutenancies to the ranks, or are directed to revise their whole system of drill and tactics. The aim should always be, not to adhere as closely as possible to the Infantry Drill Regulations, but so to adapt these regulations, and all others relating to the United States Army, to existing local conditions as to bring the unit to the highest possible degree of efficiency for its particular mission. The fact that the present system of training of the Army itself is widely at variance in many respects with the rules laid down in the formal manuals is quite enough to warrant similar departures by units formed for the purpose of local defense.

III

EQUIPMENT

42. **General Heads.**—The subject of equipment for the local defense unit may be considered under the following heads: Arms; Uniforms; Personal; Company; Headquarters.

43. **Arms and Ammunition.**—The most important, and frequently the most difficult, feature of equipping any local defense unit is that of proper arms. It is still commonly assumed that the appropriate weapon for all infantry—to which branch most local defense units belong—is the rifle, although the present war is rapidly demonstrating that this is by no means always true. The equipment of any body of troops ought to be determined by its mission. It has already been pointed out that the mission of the local defense unit, particularly in cities, is primarily preventive, its object being to keep trouble from starting, or at least from reaching serious proportions (see Paragraphs 4 and 5, also, under TACTICS, Paragraphs 70–76). Thus it will be called upon to deal far more frequently with crowds than with mobs, and most of the situations it will have to face will be such that the rifle will be an actual handicap rather than a really effective weapon. The question of arms for such units is further greatly affected in many cases by the fact that

rifles in sufficient quantities to equip every enlisted man cannot, for the present at least, be secured from the federal or state authorities. Even the new National Guard units are to be equipped only with such rifles "as may be available after the needs of all troops in Federal service have first been met." This is a serious handicap to drill, but it need not interfere with the effectiveness of the unit on active service, as the proper equipment of arms for most forms of local defense activity can be secured without government aid.

44. **United States Army Rifles.**—It is, of course, desirable to have a rifle for every enlisted man in the local defense unit. This is true particularly because of the importance of the rifle in close order drill, and in route and street marching; the military character of the organization is much easier to maintain if the men can have rifles in their hands for a part of every drill period. Furthermore, in a very serious emergency the rifle and bayonet may provide the only means for controlling the situation. Every effort should, therefore, be made to secure, through the civil authorities, a full issue of rifles and bayonets; but it should be clearly understood that these rifles are to be kept for drill and in reserve for the gravest emergencies, and do not, except as provided in Paragraph 45, constitute the proper arms for local defense service under ordinary conditions. It is important that an issue of rifles, if made, should include bayonets and ammunition; the unit must never be exposed to the taunt that it carries guns which have neither point nor powder. However, for drill purposes only, discarded types of rifle, such as

the 1873 Springfield, may profitably be used, even if neither ammunition nor bayonets are available. Such rifles should never be carried on active service.

45. **Rifles for Active Service.**—Under ordinary service conditions in the city, wherein the functions of the rifleman are limited to those of sharpshooter, sentry and reserve (see Paragraphs 92, 98), the normal weapon of the local defense unit is not the rifle, but the riot stick. The danger attendant on the discharge of a high-powered rifle within city limits is so great as to be almost prohibitive, and it is immensely increased by the fact that relatively few of the enlisted men in the average local defense unit are qualified by training and experience to handle a high-powered rifle at all. A certain number of rifles are, however, indispensable, because a situation may at any time arise which can be dealt with in no other way. For service within city or town limits, where disorderly crowds will be the usual objects of attack, the local defense unit should have always available high-powered rifles, with ammunition, in the proportion of approximately ten to every company. If Army rifles (Models 1896, 1898 or 1903) have been issued to the unit, the proper number of these can, of course, be taken out on active service; if no issue has been made, the local defense unit is pretty sure to have among its men enough owners of high-powered sporting rifles to meet the requirements. Uniformity of make and caliber, while desirable, is by no means necessary. For service in the country, where isolated outlaws and bands of armed trouble-makers are far more likely to be encountered than

in the city, the proportion of rifles should be considerably greater. In every case, the number of rifles which should form part of the service equipment (as distinct from the drill equipment) of a local defense unit should be determined (a) by tactical considerations (see Paragraphs 98-100), and (b) by the number of men in the unit fully competent to handle such weapons.

46. **Shotguns.**—For local defense, particularly in the city, the shotgun is normally far more effective than the rifle, its moral force being nearly as great, and the dangers attending its discharge being very much less. General Pershing's order for 10,000 shotguns, and the adoption by the Army of a shotgun with bayonet for sentries, show that the possibilities of this weapon are coming to be more and more fully recognized. Even if plenty of rifles are available, every local defense unit, whatever its field of action, should have shotguns always available in the proportion of approximately 20 to every company. Uniformity of gauge, though not absolutely necessary, is desirable, because of the inconvenience of carrying about a large supply of shells of various sizes. The 12-gauge shell loaded with No. 1 shot is particularly effective, and is not excessively dangerous. Buckshot, however, may also be used. While the pump-gun type is on the whole the most serviceable, automatic, double-barreled or even single-shotguns may be all used. Shotguns with sawed-off barrels—about 23 inches long—are better than those with long ones. As in the case of rifles, the number of shotguns in the service equipment should be absolutely lim-



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ited by the number of men fully qualified by experience to handle them.

47. Revolvers and Pistols.—Every member of a local defense unit should have a serviceable revolver or automatic pistol, of caliber 32 or larger, and should carry it at all times when on active service. It is his chief safeguard on any form of detached duty, and its use under any circumstances is confined mainly to self-defense. It should, therefore, be regarded as an absolutely indispensable part of the service equipment of every officer and enlisted man. As revolvers or pistols can seldom be issued to a local defense unit in large quantities by the civil authorities, every man should be directed to purchase one for himself. The purchasing should, however, be done through the ordnance officer of the unit. Every man should, furthermore, have sufficient ammunition to permit of a reasonable amount of pistol practice.

48. Riot Sticks.—Under ordinary service conditions in the city, or anywhere where a disorderly assembly may be encountered, the riot stick is by all odds the most valuable offensive weapon for the local defense unit. Properly used by disciplined bodies of men, it will suffice to overawe any crowd not extensively equipped with firearms, and will disperse an unlawful gathering or break up a meeting without bloodshed when a single shot or bayonet thrust might entail the most disastrous consequences. There is no element of "bluff" about the riot stick, for any trouble-maker knows that it will be used freely and without hesitation, whereas, unless the situation is acutely serious, no commanding officer wants

to give his men the order to fire, and the crowd is perfectly well aware of his attitude. A man is in an awkward position when he is equipped only with a weapon which he hesitates, and quite properly, to put to its correct use.

49. Shape of Riot Sticks.—Riot sticks must be absolutely uniform in appearance; the local defense unit must never permit its men to look as though they had seized any kind of a club that came to hand. The ordinary short policeman's "billy" is excellent for knocking a man out, but very poorly adapted to any other purpose. The same is true, to an even greater extent, of any form of weighted club. The best weapon is a straight, rounded oak stick, with a uniform diameter of one inch, and 30 inches long. It should have a small hole bored through it, 10 inches from one end, and through this should be tied a tough three-foot thong, forming a loop approximately 16 inches in length. Every officer and enlisted man in the unit should be equipped with one of these riot sticks. Concerning their use, see Paragraphs 193-194.

50. Machine and Field Guns.—The question of further arms, such as machine and field guns, must be determined by local conditions, and by the availability of men competent to handle them. Such weapons are rarely procurable by local defense units, but are of very great value in cases of organized and armed resistance to the law. The machine gun is, of course, a weapon to be held in reserve until there is every reason to believe that no less destructive force will avail. It should never be brought out as a mere menace, and only an extraordinary

situation would warrant its use. Field artillery is of value for local defense chiefly in attacking a strongly entrenched or barricaded position. In the city its employment is almost out of the question; a situation calling for the use of field guns would likewise fully warrant the sending of regular Army troops to assume charge. In open country, however, there have been cases where outlaws have fortified themselves in an isolated house, or in some similar position, so strong as to defy rifle fire. Under such circumstances a few shells from a field gun may save a good many lives. Any local defense unit which can keep a machine gun, a field gun, or both, in reserve is thereby prepared to deal with practically any situation which might conceivably arise. The chances of really needing either weapon, however, are relatively slight, and an incalculable amount of harm might easily be done by employing either of them when they were unnecessary. It need hardly be said that they should be handled only by thoroughly trained and experienced gunners.

51. Purchase of Arms.—It often happens that a local defense unit has at its disposal a fund for the purchase of equipment, part of which is to be devoted to buying arms. Before any purchases are made, a census should be taken of all rifles, shotguns, pistols and revolvers owned by members of the unit, this census being accompanied by an inspection. If rifles and ammunition are issued by the authorities, the census need not include rifles, and no account need be taken of them in planning purchases. Otherwise, enough high-powered magazine

sporting rifles, with at least 100 rounds of ammunition for each rifle, should be bought to bring the total up to 10 per company. Riot sticks should next be provided. These can be turned out, with the thongs, for 20 or 25 cents apiece, and it is generally advisable to have the men pay for them themselves, as in that way they are less likely to lose them. Third, the revolvers and pistols should be checked up, and men lacking such weapons, or with manifestly inadequate ones, should be directed to purchase them. Part of the fund may properly be used to buy a reserve supply of revolvers, to equip men who cannot afford to buy them, and also for the purchase of ammunition for pistol practice. Finally, enough shot-guns, of uniform bore and type (12-gauge pump-guns, if possible), with at least 50 shells to each gun, should be purchased to bring the total up to 20 per company. Not until this equipment of arms is complete should any money be spent on guns ("dummy" or otherwise) purely for drill purposes.

52. **Uniforms.**—It is essential that every local defense unit should be fully equipped with uniforms, and equally essential that there should be no violation of Section 125 of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916. This section prescribes what organizations may, and what may not, wear the distinctive uniform adopted by the United States Army, and makes no special provision for local units other than those regularly organized as a part of the authorized military forces of the state. A local defense unit organized under state laws, whether as part of the authorized National Guard as or state police

or constabulary (Section 61 of the National Defense Act), will adopt a uniform in accordance with regulations issued by the adjutant general of the state. Units under county or municipal authority should likewise apply to the state adjutant general for information regarding uniforms and insignia. A circular published by the Adjutant General's Office, issued July 7, 1916, contains excellent suggestions as to insignia for units not entitled to wear those of the Army.

53. Essentials of Uniform.—The requisites for the uniform of any local defense unit are that it should be (a) distinctive; (b) complete; (c) provided with insignia for the hat, overcoat, blouse and shirt clearly and immediately recognizable; (d) serviceable. The last is the most important of all. Every man should be fully equipped with prescribed articles of clothing for wear in every sort of weather he is at all likely to encounter. Heavy, lined overcoats and warm gloves for cold weather, and rain-proof coats or slickers for service in the wet when the heavy overcoat would be burdensome, are particularly important. The uniform should include an outside belt (preferably web) for carrying the pistol holster. The essential articles are: hat; blouse; shirt (flannel); breeches (preferably short, to be worn with leggings or puttees); leggings or spiral puttees (with leather puttees for the officers); shoes; belt (inside); pistol belt; holster; gloves; overcoat (the short lined coat has many advantages over the long one); raincoat or slicker.

54. Shoes.—Company officers should pay special attention to the socks and shoes worn by their men,

particularly if, as is generally the case in local defense units, shoes are not issued as part of the uniform equipment. The average business or professional man has very little idea of the requirements of active service, and is likely to report for duty with shoes that will incapacitate him after a few hours. Frozen, swollen, blistered or sore feet can generally be avoided if the officers will give the matter of shoes timely and proper attention.

55. Method of Purchasing Uniforms.—Whether the uniforms are paid for by the state, county or city, out of a special fund devoted to the equipment of the unit, or by the men themselves, the matter should always be handled through the supply officer of the unit. Each man, at the time he enlists or enrolls, should report his measurements (see Paragraph 14), and the order for his uniform should be put through only with the indorsement of his company commander. Unless the uniforms are paid for and owned by the men individually, the supply officer should keep an accurate record of all uniform equipment ordered, on hand, or issued. A card for each man to whom equipment is issued should be kept at headquarters, with the name of every article of the equipment printed on it, and each man should sign his card opposite the name of each article as he receives it. Furthermore, each company commander should be responsible to the supply officer of the battalion or regiment for every article of equipment issued to the men of his company. He, in turn, should make each squad leader responsible for the equipment issued to his squad. If this matter of responsibility is not very carefully

mapped out, the changing nature of the personnel of most local defense units will inevitably result in the disappearance of valuable supplies.

56. Personal Equipment.—It will seldom be possible to issue much in the way of personal equipment to the men of a local defense unit, so that each man will find it necessary to provide for himself such personal equipment as he will need. Practically everything absolutely required can, however, be found in any household. It is the duty of the company officers to indicate to their men just what articles they should have always in readiness for a sudden call, and then, through inspections at drill, to see that their instructions have been followed. When practice mobilizations are held (see Paragraph 27), it is advisable sometimes to order the men to report for duty with full field equipment, and then to hold an inspection as soon as the mobilization has been completed. Since extended tours of field duty beyond the reach of supplies are relatively unlikely, the personal equipment need not be large.

57. Minimum Field Equipment.—Each man's service equipment will include, first of all, his uniform (see Paragraph 53) and arms (see Paragraphs 45-49). In addition, he should have a good all-wool blanket, with straps to secure it as a roll. He will need a small tin, or, better, aluminum, plate and cup, a knife, fork and spoon, a cake of soap, a towel, a dish-cloth, a toothbrush, a hairbrush, an extra pair of socks, an extra undershirt and pair of drawers, a pair of extra shoe laces, a pencil and a small notebook or pad of paper. A wrist watch, a pocket

knife, some toilet paper and a box of matches are valuable additions. A haversack, or small canvas bag which can be slung on the back or over the shoulder, is very useful, but not absolutely essential, as the articles composing the field kit can ordinarily be packed and carried in the blanket roll. A canteen and meat can are desirable, and are essential for prolonged service outside of the city. Finally, each man's equipment should include a small first-aid packet.

58. Conditions Regulating Equipment.—The extent of the personal equipment will be regulated by local conditions, and the kind of service which may reasonably be expected. A unit organized to operate in or very close to a city needs to prescribe only the minimum of equipment for its men. On the other hand, a unit which may be called far from home and away from towns for considerable periods will need practically the full personal equipment prescribed as the regular Army field kit. It is advisable for the officers, when informing the men as to the indispensable articles listed in Paragraph 57, at the same time to give them a list of further articles which would be required for extended field service, and to direct each man to have such articles in readiness in case of a sudden call. It must be impressed on all the men that, in the event of a call, no time must be wasted in hunting up and getting together the personal equipment; it should be kept at home in such a way that it can be made ready for use without material delay.

59. Company Equipment.—Owing to the nature of local defense service, the company, whether it forms a

unit by itself or is part of a battalion or regiment, must be capable of operating independently, and thus must be to a considerable extent self-supporting. Its field service equipment will, therefore, include many things which would normally concern only the larger units. There is, however, no necessity that every article of the company's field equipment should actually be at all times in the possession of the company officers; it is frequently quite sufficient that the officers should know exactly where they can get hold of the articles of equipment they may need, at very short notice. The character of the local defense unit makes it undesirable to accumulate any great quantity of supplies, and the heavy expense involved in so doing is a further argument against having the company attempt to buy all the equipment it may need.

60. Tents, Cots and Blankets.—Among the articles which need not, or should not, be bought, but which the officers must be able to secure promptly and without fail, may be mentioned tents, cots, motor trucks, motor cycles, portable telephone and telegraph sets, a portable typewriter, and cooking apparatus, including a portable stove. Tents are rarely issued to local defense units, and they are so expensive that it is seldom worth while to buy them. At the same time, the company commander should find out where tents can be secured in an emergency, and should make the necessary arrangements for getting possession of them. The local defense unit is, however, far more likely to be quartered in buildings when on active service than under canvas, and the com-

pany commander should make arrangements whereby, at need, he can secure cots for his entire company. In cold weather he should likewise know where he can get hold of a supply of extra blankets. In the larger local defense units, such matters will presumably be dealt with by the supply officer, or, in the case of regiments, by the supply company, but the company commander must never forget that he, and he alone, is responsible for the welfare of the men under his command. It never keeps anybody warm, or gives him a good night's sleep, to learn that "somebody else" ought to have attended to his comfort; the company commander who relies too much on "somebody else" is sooner or later going to regret it. If he is absolutely certain of his own ability to secure tents, cots and extra blankets when he needs them, he will never have to feel that he has been neglectful of his duty in this respect.

61. Transportation Equipment.—The importance to the local defense unit of an effective transportation system has been already pointed out (see Paragraphs 25–27). The company is often likely to be called on to transport itself, the urgency being too great to permit of delay until transportation can be secured from some outside agency. This may, of course, be done by means of automobiles owned by members of the company; but the automobile has the great disadvantage of splitting up the company into far too many small groups, and also of being ill adapted to carrying supplies. Furthermore, many automobiles are likely to be laid up during the winter. Motor trucks, particularly in the city, provide



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the ideal means for transporting men and supplies from place to place. A powerful truck will easily accommodate a full platoon; it can carry the company's entire equipment; it can be used, at need, as a wrecking car for removing obstacles from roads, streetcar or railroad tracks. Every company commander should, therefore, make arrangements whereby he can at any time secure the use of one or more big motor trucks, and should be sure that he has trustworthy men competent to drive them. He should also be always in a position to get hold of a couple of motor cycles, which, for scout or orderly service, have marked advantages over automobiles. In case his company is ordered out for service in the country, he should procure field telephone and telegraph sets, and be sure that he has in his company men capable of installing and operating them. The company mechanics may profitably be trained for this service. Finally, whenever the company is on active service, the company clerk should have with him a portable typewriter, with plenty of stationery and carbon paper.

62. Mess Equipment.—The problem of the company mess depends for its solution entirely on the immediate conditions of service. For work within city limits no very large cooking outfit is necessary; unless the tour of duty is a long one, it is generally simpler and better to have the food supplied and prepared, under the supervision of the company mess sergeant, by restaurants or caterers. For service in the country, on the other hand, a complete cooking outfit is indispensable. Conditions of service vary so greatly that it is wiser not to lay in a

large and expensive supply of cooking utensils, which may prove entirely unfitted to the needs when the time comes. The company mess sergeant, under the direction of the company commander, and with the guidance of the Manual for Army Cooks and Holbrook's "Mess Sergeant's Hand Book," should make a careful study of the local situation, finding out within what limits, and from what sources, he can count on adequate supplies of cooked food for short periods, and preparing a list of such utensils, with the places where they can be promptly secured, as may be needed if the company is forced to depend on its own cooking. If any articles of equipment are to be bought, the most useful single one is probably a 20-gallon insulated can, such as is often used for the transportation of milk. This will keep water cold, or coffee reasonably hot, for several hours, and can be transported along with the company by automobile or motor truck. For supplies needed when the company is quartered in a factory or public building, see Paragraph 89.

63. Permanent Company Supplies.—Among its permanent supplies the company should include at least two sets of flags for two-arm semaphore signaling; two bugles; the appropriate whistles for the captain, platoon leaders and guides; morning report blanks, order and duty roster blanks, a correspondence book and a document file. The hospital sergeant attached to the company should always have ready as complete a first-aid equipment as possible, together with such medical supplies as may reasonably be required during a week or so of con-

tinuous field service. In local defense units larger than a single company, the surgeon should frequently inspect the company medical and surgical equipment.

64. Company Fund.—Owing to the uncertainties of local defense service, it is important that the company commander should always have available a considerable company fund on which he can draw when there is no time to requisition supplies or subsistence from the civil authorities. Every local defense company should, therefore, arrange a regular system of contributions from each man to the company fund, the fund to be held in trust by the company commander, and administered by the Company Council of Administration, consisting of the captain and the two lieutenants. As the expenses of a local defense company are normally small, a monthly contribution of 50 cents from each man will generally be enough to provide a safe surplus in case of need. The books of the company fund should be open to the inspection of the men at all times. In the larger units, each company should contribute a fixed amount periodically to the battalion or regimental fund.

65. Ambulance Company Supplies.—In the larger units, as has been pointed out (Paragraph 17), it is desirable to have a separate ambulance company formed. In state organizations, its officers and enlisted men will form part of the personnel of the Medical Corps of the state forces. The size of such a company depends on circumstances, but for an independent battalion an ambulance company of three officers and 32 enlisted men is none too large. A company of the same size would be

sufficient for a regiment acting as a unit, but inadequate if the companies or battalions were used separately. The ambulance company needs, first of all, adequate means of transportation: one or two ambulances, if possible, but at any rate suitable automobiles. Stretchers should be provided in the ratio of at least two to each company. A hospital tent is desirable, with a portable operating table. The equipment of surgical and medical supplies and instruments should be as complete as available funds will permit. The plan of equipment should be so arranged that subdivisions of the whole unit, such as detached companies, can be fitted out with reasonable completeness at the shortest possible notice.

66. Headquarters Maps.—If the local defense company is not part of a larger organization, or, although nominally part of a battalion or regiment, is the single unit in its town or district, it will need certain further equipment which would normally belong to headquarters. The most important feature of this headquarters equipment is a map, or set of maps, of the entire region in which the unit may reasonably expect to be called upon to operate. It is of vital importance that the commanding officer and his staff should know intimately every important geographical detail of the locality in which his men may be on active service. This is particularly true of cities. The city local defense unit should have at its headquarters the largest map of the city which can be obtained, with important points indicated in relief. Railroads, street car lines, water mains and electric power lines may be indicated by strings of dif-

ferent colors fastened to the map by push pins. Important buildings, such as armories, arsenals, large warehouses, municipal, county and state buildings, hospitals, important manufacturing plants, power stations, gas tanks, railroad stations, etc., may be indicated by small blocks of wood, or colored corks, attached to the map. The map should be supplemented by a card index of all important points in the city, including the addresses of all dealers in firearms and explosives, public garages, warehouses of foodstuffs, fire department stations, freight terminals, bridges, etc. For districts outside of the city there should be large road maps, in which the important tactical features, such as woods, hills, rivers, lakes, marshes, defiles, bridges, etc., should be clearly marked. As a feature of the training in map work, an ordinary district or county road map may be converted into a military map by the men of the unit.

67. General Headquarters Equipment.—The headquarters of a local defense unit should, of course, be equipped with a telephone, and, if the district to be covered is large, arrangements should be made whereby a special telegraph wire can be promptly connected. It should have a desk for the commanding officer and one for the adjutant, a typewriter and typewriter table, and filing cases for the card roster of the organization and for the supply officer's records. It should have all the necessary equipment for the paperwork of the organization (see Paragraph 33). It should, in addition, contain as many military manuals and textbooks as can be secured, and thus should be a reference library for the

officers of the unit (see Paragraph 202, wherein a list of particularly useful books is given). Any books or publications dealing with the geography, industry, population and history of the district which the unit is to protect are also of great value.

68. Equipment Determined by Mission.—Every phase of the equipment of a local defense unit will be greatly influenced by local conditions: the legal status of the organization and its relation to the state, county or municipal authorities; the amount of government property issued to it; the amount of money available for equipment; the size of the unit and of the community in which it exists; the area it is expected to cover; the character of its personnel; the space available for its headquarters, drill, and storage of supplies. But, even taking all these matters into consideration, the fundamental truth remains that the nature of the equipment is primarily determined by one thing: the mission of the organization. Since its mission is unquestionably to preserve peace and order—the *suppression* of disorder is a secondary, though very necessary, phase—its equipment should be such as to enable it, by superior mobility and tactical efficiency, to deal with trouble-makers before they have an opportunity to become rioters.

IV

TACTICS

69. **Main Types of Activity.**—The tactics of the local defense unit will be determined in every case by the nature of the problem it is ordered to solve. It may be called on to do anything from arresting a single criminal in uninhabited country to fighting a pitched battle with an armed mob in the city streets. Its methods, therefore, will vary all the way from those of the policeman or constable to those of the Regular Army. It is impossible to lay down rules applicable throughout so broad a field; but it is possible to distinguish the main types of local defense service, and to formulate the tactical principles which should govern the actions of the unit under these different conditions. The drill should necessarily be based largely on these principles, for otherwise the unit, when called into active service, will find itself lamentably ill prepared for the work it has in hand. Four main types of local defense service, and consequently four distinct types of tactics, may be indicated: CROWD, MOB, OPEN COUNTRY, and INTERIOR.

70. **Definition of Types.**—Of these four types, crowd tactics are by all odds the most important for the local defense unit. Every mob starts as a crowd, and since the first object of the local defense unit is to prevent the

crowd from developing into a mob, it is clear that a sound system of crowd tactics, effectively carried out, will fulfill the mission of the unit. Most trouble in towns and cities, in its initial stages, is a subject for crowd rather than mob tactics; strikes, industrial disorder, and even race riots, almost always start with crowds which, if caught in time, can best be handled without the application of tactics suitable and necessary for quelling a fully developed mob. It is in this respect that the military manuals are most unsatisfactory from the point of view of local defense. Regular troops are seldom called out to handle a mere crowd, and even the National Guard was rarely used until the mob stage had been reached. The sections on street riot duty in the military manuals, therefore, concern essentially mob tactics, and thereby furnish most uncertain guidance to the local defense commander confronted with a crowd which he wishes to prevent from becoming a mob, but on which he has no possible excuse for firing. Open country tactics, on a small scale, are nearly identical with the Army principles regarding scouting and patrolling; on a large scale they do not differ greatly from the prescribed methods of combat. As for interior tactics—the establishment of garrisons in buildings, hunting for criminals in houses, and other forms of indoor service,—the principles are few and simple, although their application is immensely varied, difficult and dangerous.

71. Crowds and Mobs.—For the reasons that crowd tactics form the basis of the work of any local defense unit in the city or town, that disorderly crowds constitute



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A City Crowd in the First Stages of a Disturbance



the phenomenon which such a unit will most frequently have to deal with, and that they are covered least adequately of all the four types in the military manuals—they may, indeed, fairly be said not to be covered at all,—they will here receive by far the most thorough consideration; the other types will merely be touched on. Crowd tactics may be defined as the principles governing the operations of an armed and disciplined body against a considerable group, or number of separate groups, which is disorderly and inclined to violence, but which has not as yet temporarily lost its collective sense of fear. A mob, on the other hand, is distinguished by the fact that, under the stimulus of intense excitement, its members have actually lost all sense of fear of the law, and can only be brought to their senses by an overpowering demonstration of force.

72. Transition from Crowd to Mob.—A crowd, by its very definition, is cowardly. It still hesitates to commit itself to a course of unrestrained violence, even though some of its members may be guilty of violent acts when they think they have a good chance of escape. It may be noisy and threatening, and if left to its own devices is very likely to commit assaults and depredations which will excite it to the mob pitch; but just as long as the crowd is kept well in hand, its collective cowardice remains its most striking feature. The subtle change by which a crowd becomes a mob is a thing never forgotten by any one who has seen it. An apparent weakening of the forces holding the crowd in check, even though it be but momentary, may suffice to bring about the trans-

formation; a single piece of audacious violence successfully carried through; two minutes' harangue by a fiery leader; the appearance on the street of a conspicuous and hated figure. It is the business of the local defense unit to see that this change does not take place, for the formation of a mob means bloodshed and destruction before the fear of the law is restored to its proper power.

73. Absence of Leadership.—The cowardice of the crowd is due to the lack of unity among its members, and the half-heartedness of many of them for any enterprise involving danger. A large part of any disorderly crowd is made up of mere spectators—good material for the mob spirit to work on, but in the beginning perfectly harmless. The proportion of determined trouble-makers in a city crowd, before it has fairly “got going,” is probably not one to ten. The leaders, the real sources of danger, are rarely in the front ranks, as is commonly supposed; they are far more likely to be circulating through and in the rear of the crowd, awaiting a good opportunity to throw a stone or fire a shot. Genuine leadership, at this stage, is conspicuously absent, and it is this fact that gives the disciplined unit, immediately responsive to the will of its commander, its greatest advantage.

74. “Getting There First.”—The change from confusion to unity under sudden leadership, from the vacillating crowd to the determined mob, may come in a minute's time, and nothing is so likely to bring about the change as a single successful act of violence. It is, therefore, a cardinal principle of crowd tactics to “get there first.” If a crowd can be prevented from forming, the



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Strikers Outside a Factory Gate: First Stage of a Riot

work of the local defense unit is done almost before it has started. Crowds may form rapidly, but they very seldom do so without giving previous warning. For instance, a meeting of strikers, malcontents, Industrial Workers of the World or other potential trouble-makers may at any time prove the first step in the formation of a disorderly crowd. The fact that such a meeting is being held should, in any period of local unrest, be sufficient warning to the commander of the local defense unit that trouble may follow; the critical moment is the one at which the meeting breaks up, and the people attending it come out on the street. The sight of a few squads of armed men, though it may lead to jeers and abuse, will send the timid and half-hearted members scurrying to their homes, leaving the bolder spirits without support, and consequently impotent to start trouble. The indoor meeting is the chief originator of the outdoor disorderly crowd; and since the fact that such a meeting is to be held is generally made public in advance, the local defense unit commander has an opportunity to be beforehand with the crowd. The neglect of such an opportunity may cost dear.

75. Anticipating Disorder.—In a similar way, many of the excuses for the formation of a crowd can be foretold with considerable accuracy from a close knowledge of the local situation. In a strike or industrial disturbance, it is a safe guess that a crowd will form, if not prevented, within two or three hours of the time when the strike order is first issued, at or near the plant, factory or locality chiefly affected. The crowd will attempt to form

again periodically when the non-striking workmen are entering the plant in the morning, and leaving it at night. Crowds form naturally in the city at points where traffic is congested, particularly in the "rush hours." The half-hour at night immediately preceding and following the legal closing time for saloons is a period to be closely watched, for a single saloon can supply the nucleus for a disorderly crowd. By carefully studying the situation, the local defense unit commander can estimate with considerable accuracy the times and points at which crowds are most likely to form, and can forestall them by a judicious disposition of his men.

76. Rapidity of Mobilization.—It is in this connection that rapidity of mobilization, discussed in Paragraphs 19-29, is most important. The local defense unit cannot be held ready for instant service all the time; its members must be allowed to go about their business except when an emergency actually develops. In no other form of military service is it so true that the first blow is half the battle; if the men cannot be brought together at the point of danger quickly enough to prevent a crowd from forming, the hour or two of delay may mean the necessity of mob tactics, and loaded rifles. It should be impressed on every officer and enlisted man in the unit that the proper time to deal with a crowd is an hour or so before it has begun to form.

77. The Service of Information.—The service of information is of the utmost importance in this respect; a local defense unit commander who does not know exactly what is going on is sure, sooner or later, to com-

mit the unpardonable blunder of being caught by surprise. He should at all times keep himself thoroughly posted as to conditions in his district, particularly as regards unemployment, food and fuel shortage, labor unrest, the presence in the community of undesirable outsiders, and activities below the surface inimical to the government. For this purpose he should be in close touch with the local police and sheriff's offices, and with the federal secret service. Every man in the unit should be instructed to keep his eyes and ears open at all times, and to report to headquarters anything coming to his attention which might indicate possible disorder. It is well for the unit to have affiliated with itself, and under the orders of its officers, a considerable number of men out of uniform who, particularly when trouble has actually started, can secure information beyond the reach of uniformed men. The proper maintenance of the service of information is the duty primarily of the field and staff officers, and strict attention to it in times of apparent quiet may, when the emergency comes, result in the saving of many lives and the prevention of a vast amount of property damage.

78. Military Districts.—It is advisable for the commander of any local defense unit to divide the territory with which he is chiefly concerned into military districts, assigning each one to a subdivision—a platoon, company or battalion, depending on the size of the unit—of his command. The officers will then proceed, by actual investigation, to familiarize themselves closely with the districts thus assigned to them, and, in the event of widely

extended disorder, will naturally operate chiefly in the districts which they have thus studied. They will, furthermore, during periods of quiet maintain a general responsibility for the service of information in their districts, reporting to headquarters anything worthy of note.

79. Keeping a Crowd from Forming.—With an adequate service of information, and an effective mobilization system, the local defense unit stands a good chance of forestalling the formation of any disorderly crowd. It is not enough, however, merely to arrive on the scene of action ahead of the potential trouble-makers; every officer and noncommissioned officer must have a clear understanding of what should be done to keep the crowd from forming. There must be no uncertainty or hesitation in this preliminary stage of the tour of duty, and the conduct of all the officers and noncommissioned officers must be based on a single well-defined plan of action.

80. Obstructing Passage and Unlawful Assembly.—In practically every community the municipal ordinances or state statutes, or both, put in the hands of the local defense unit an admirably effective weapon for handling the situation which exists before a crowd has really formed. This is the regulation covering loitering in the streets and unlawful assembly. The usual form is something like this:

“Three or more persons shall not stand together or near each other in any street, or on any foot walk or sidewalk within the limits of the city, so as to

obstruct the free passage for foot passengers, and any person or persons so standing shall move on immediately after a request to do so made by any peace officer.

“Whenever three or more persons shall assemble with intent to commit any unlawful act by force; to carry out any purpose in such a manner as to disturb the public peace; or, being assembled, shall attempt or threaten any act tending toward a breach of the peace or an injury to persons or property, such an assembly is unlawful, and every person participating therein by his presence, aid or instigation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Every officer and noncommissioned officer of a local defense unit should know exactly what are the local regulations covering unlawful assembly and gatherings in the streets. He should use them, in the stages before a disorderly crowd has formed, to keep people constantly moving. Trouble rarely starts as long as stationary groups are never allowed to form, particularly if the motion is maintained in *one direction*. This can almost always be accomplished without the use of force, provided the local defense commander has enough men at his disposal.

EXAMPLE. Captain Smith, commanding Company A of the local defense battalion, is notified by the commanding officer that a meeting of teamsters is scheduled for 8 p. m. that same evening at Brown's Hall, which is situated in Captain Smith's military district. The teamsters have been restless, and

there have been rumors of a strike and threats of violence. Brown's Hall is on the second floor, and there is a saloon underneath it.

Captain Smith at once orders his company to mobilize at a public garage about four blocks away from the hall, setting the hour of mobilization at 7 p. m., so that the teamsters and his men will not be turning up at the same time. He also directs three or four ununiformed men to report for duty. As soon as the company is fully mobilized, he notifies battalion headquarters of the fact, stating that his field headquarters, until further notice, will be at the public garage, the telephone number of which he likewise reports. Then he issues his orders covering patrols and reliefs, with provision for the guard at the garage. His patrols in the neighborhood of the hall will be a full squad each.

As the meeting progresses, he observes that men are frequently coming out of the hall and entering the saloon beneath. His ununiformed men, therefore, pay sundry casual visits to the saloon, where they learn that the teamsters in the hall are planning to leave in a body and proceed to a neighboring freight office, where trucks are being loaded.

Captain Smith explains to his men that, after the meeting is over, no groups will be allowed to loiter on the sidewalk or in the street within two blocks of either the hall or the freight office, and that groups on the north sidewalks of each street will be moved east, while those on the south sidewalks will be


moved west. Similarly, on the cross streets, groups on the west sidewalks will be moved north, and those on the east sidewalks will be moved south. He lays this schedule out in such a way that the men leaving the hall will be unable to start in the direction of the freight house without crossing the street. He then dispatches a platoon to the freight office.

About 9 p. m. Captain Smith strengthens his patrols so that his company is disposed as follows: four squads at the freight office; two squads at the garage; three squads held in reserve in the side street nearest to the hall; three squads in line at the curb across the street from the hall; four squads patrolling the street in front of the hall and the next side street leading in the direction of the freight office. When the meeting breaks up, and the first men come straggling out of the door, they see opposite them the three squads in line. They hesitate, then start to move in the direction of the freight office; already, however, much of their enthusiasm is dampened, for they had expected to wait undisturbed on the sidewalk until more men had come down from the hall. Promptly one of the patrols stops them and orders them to go in the other direction. If they are slow in obeying, or attempt to argue, the patrol, in diagonal formation (see Paragraph 110) sets them in motion. The next patrol picks up the second group emerging from the hall, and so on. At the corner the men encounter the

three squads held there in reserve, which pay no attention to them unless they attempt to proceed along the wrong side of the street, in which case a squad turns them back. Within ten minutes, and without the necessity for striking a blow, the streets are likely to be cleared, and a serious menace has been averted. If, however, any of the more adventurous among the teamsters attempt to reach the freight office by roundabout routes, they get there only to encounter the four squads detailed as a guard. The first man who resists when directed to move on is promptly arrested (see Paragraph 82) for violating the ordinance with regard to loitering on the street.

As soon as everything is quiet, Captain Smith reports the fact to battalion headquarters, and if no further orders are issued to him, and a careful survey of the district leads him to believe that there is no danger of further trouble, he dismisses his company.

81. Establishing Restrictions.—When it is desired to prevent a crowd from forming, the plan to be followed should not only be made perfectly clear to the men of the local defense unit, but also, in many cases, to the public. For instance, in a case of industrial trouble, the commanding officer intends to prevent a crowd from forming in front of the entrance to the factory affected. He therefore directs his men to permit no one to loiter on the streets or sidewalks adjoining the factory, to permit no vehicles to stop on the street in front of the building, to allow no one to pass along the north sidewalk except in a



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Rioters Pursuing Deputies Who Have Just Made an Arrest

westerly direction, and no one along the south sidewalk except when going east. These restrictions should at once be made clear by the men of the command to any individuals or groups who may be disposed to dispute them, and the squads on guard at each end of the block should take pains to see that the regulations are fully understood.

82. Arrests.—It is assumed that, in any period of active service, the members of a local defense unit will be clothed with the powers of peace officers, as special constables, deputy sheriffs or state constabulary. It is essential that this should be done, as otherwise the legal authority of individual members to issue orders or make arrests will be doubtful. It is the duty of all officers to see that their men fully and clearly understand the essentials of the state or local laws and ordinances under which they may be called upon to act, and it is well to have a brief printed synopsis of these laws placed in every man's hands. In dealing with a crowd, the making of arrests requires a considerable amount of good judgment. Arrests should, of course, be made whenever possible in cases of actual violence; there should be no delay in capturing any man seen to throw a stone, display a firearm or other dangerous weapon, or damage property. On the other hand, it is undesirable to make arrests for mere stubbornness or slowness in obeying orders, if the desired result can be attained by simpler means. It is needless to say that every order, once given, must be absolutely enforced; but in dealing with the initial stages of a disorderly crowd, a combination of tact, coolness and de-

termination will render many an arrest unnecessary. At times, however, an arrest is exceedingly desirable, either to remove a persistent trouble-maker from the scene, or for its effect on the crowd. An arrest, if ordered, should be made at once (for tactics see Paragraph 122). The more rapidly the order is executed, the greater will be the effect on those who witness it. The arrested person should be at once conveyed away from the scene, and promptly turned over to the proper civil authorities; the man making the arrest, together with at least one witness, should always accompany the prisoner to the police or sheriff's office, in order to give a clear account of the reasons for his arrest.

83. The Necessity for Discipline.—In dealing with any kind of a crowd, it must be remembered that the local defense unit will almost invariably be very greatly outnumbered; odds of ten to one must be accepted as nothing in any way abnormal. In the case of a mob the military organization has the advantage of being justified from the start in using its rifles; intimidating the mob may prove a costly and bloody process, but it can be done, and the mob knows it. In handling a crowd the local defense unit can have no such overwhelming advantage in weapons; it has rifles, shotguns and revolvers, indeed, but its object is to avoid using them. The one way in which it can offset the numerical superiority of the crowd is by its discipline. One hour of effectively applied crowd tactics will more than justify all the weeks spent in executing *Squads Right*, for it is only through the discipline and precision acquired in rigorous

close order drill that the unit can be sure of fulfilling its mission. This point should be particularly impressed on all the men. The minute the local defense unit, face to face with a crowd which has in it the elements of a dangerous mob, loses its military cohesion, it sinks almost to the level of the crowd, and it has every right to expect failure.

84. Working as Units.—It follows that, on active service, military discipline should be enforced with absolute rigidity. All close order movements should be executed with the precision of the drill ground. Orders and commands must be obeyed with unhesitating promptness. Above all, the units must work as such, never permitting the individuals composing them to straggle away. The officers and noncommissioned officers must keep their men always in hand; whether the commanding officer orders Corporal Jones to make an arrest with his squad, or Captain Smith to clear a street with his company, the unit must be immediately and completely available. The weakness of many local defense units lies in the tendency of the men, under the impulse of excitement, to forget that they are effective, not as individuals, but only as parts of a machine. Discipline, in substance, means simply that the commanding officer can make his will immediately and effectively felt by every man under his command, and this he cannot do unless each company, platoon, section and squad is doing its work in proper relation to the work of the whole body.

EXAMPLE. Captain Smith has a turbulent crowd

on his hands, which he is barely managing to hold in check. Three platoons are holding the crowd back on the sidewalks, so as to keep the street from being blocked; the fourth platoon (two sections) has been ordered to stay in reserve, in close order, in the middle of the street. Several of the men, however, seeing that their comrades lined up along the curbs are having a hard time, have gone to their assistance, two of the four squad leaders being among the stragglers.

Suddenly Captain Smith observes that a group of trouble-makers has formed in the sheltering darkness of a neighboring alley, from which they seem to be preparing to rush out. He immediately commands Sergeant Brown, one of the section commanders of the reserve platoon, to throw his section into wedge formation (see Paragraph 106), and charge up the alley, dispersing whatever groups he finds there. Sergeant Brown gives the command, but his section has scattered; only 9 of his 16 men are assembled, and, owing to the blank files, they cannot readily take their proper positions in the wedge. The whole purpose of the captain in holding out a reserve has been frustrated, and perhaps the crowd has been permitted to pass the line which has kept it from being a mob, simply because half a dozen men forgot their discipline in their desire to "get into the fight."

85. One Man in Command.—Whether the unit for the moment is a squad or a regiment, there is one man,

and one only, in command. He may make mistakes, but it is infinitely better that he should make them, and have his men obey his orders, than that some of them should endeavor to correct what they take to be his errors by acting in opposition to orders and according to their own judgment of what should be done. It takes years of military training to instill this idea into some men's heads; it is perhaps the hardest task of the officers of any local defense unit to get it fully understood by all their men. It is, however, worth far more than all the work it has cost when an officer sees a unit operating with perfect steadiness and cohesion in the face of danger, and knows that he can direct the entire force of that unit wherever he chooses with the same certainty as that with which he can control the discharge of his own pistol. The figure is worth remembering: the disciplined company is a smoothly working automatic pistol, the seven bullets from which can be directed at one target, or at seven, with no fear that a single one of them will fail; the undisciplined company is a rusty matchlock gun, slow to operate, capable of firing only one shot without reloading, and likely to miss fire at the critical moment.

86. The Military Attitude.—The discipline of the unit, and its full effect on the crowd, can be maintained only if every man preserves a strictly military attitude toward his work. Here again, what is easy enough for the professional soldier is often very hard for the volunteer of the local defense unit. He may see some one he knows in the crowd, or he may be tempted to stop and argue a point with a windy breeder of disorder. Herein lies one

great value of the uniform: it goes far toward accomplishing an actual transformation of the man who wears it, and helps to make a soldier, for the time being, out of a civilian. The men must be taught to go about their work quietly, firmly and impersonally. They must absolutely disregard abuse, taunts and vile language—of which a single day of riot service will bring them more than they had previously heard in their entire lives. They must never argue or quarrel. Their business is to *obey orders and make their own orders immediately obeyed.*

87. Impartiality.—In any industrial disturbance, such as a strike, it is essential to the maintenance of this impersonal military attitude that the local defense unit should remain strictly impartial, and never give ground for the accusation that it is taking sides. Its single business is to maintain peace and order, which means the protection of life and property. Since the property particularly open to attack belongs to one of the parties to the controversy, the other side—the strikers—will, of course, assume that the local defense unit is acting solely in behalf of the property owners. Every possible measure should be taken to demonstrate that the unit is under orders from no one but the civil authorities, and that it is working for the best interests of all law-abiding citizens. It should take pains actually to assist the strikers in anything that is entirely legitimate for them to do, and in case there is a hostile, or strike-breaking, faction inclined to violence, the local defense unit should show its impartiality by affording full protection to the strikers. It should be careful not to be placed under

obligation to either party in an industrial dispute; all questions regarding compensation for time lost, supplies of food, and other expenses which a corporation is usually glad to incur for the sake of efficient protection during a strike, should be dealt with by the civil authorities, not by the officers of the unit. The city, county or state government may accept remuneration to cover actual expenses involved in affording protection; the local defense unit as such should never do so.

88. Saving the Men.—The local defense unit officer on active service must never forget the extent of the sacrifice which his men are making in thus giving so freely of their time and strength. Some of them can ill afford to lose many hours or days from their work. The officers should, therefore, do everything to save their men that is consonant with reasonable prudence and safety. In the city the likely times for trouble are evenings, Sundays and holidays; on weekdays between 8:30 a. m. and 4:30 p. m. the mass of the population has better things to do than joining in disorderly demonstrations. It is thus often possible during an extended tour of duty to let many of the men go to their work for at least a part of each day. In a similar way, they should be given every possible opportunity to spend at least a few hours at home. They will cheerfully put up with almost any amount of fatigue and discomfort when on duty if they feel that their officers will give them every bit of freedom that is consistent with the public safety.

89. Quarters and Food.—The proper quartering and feeding of the men when on active service is a matter

of the utmost importance, and one which depends so largely on local conditions that very few general principles can be formulated. In the city the men will rarely need to be quartered in tents, and if the trouble is of short duration, or not serious, many or all of them will be able to sleep at their homes. In a situation of any gravity, however, it will almost always be necessary to keep men at or near the danger points, or at some central location in reserve, ready for instant service, both night and day. The essential thing is not to disperse these forces at night; the men on duty, for instance, should never be quartered in private houses, a few to each house, if it can possibly be avoided. An armory, public hall, schoolhouse, church, car station, railroad station, freight terminal, warehouse, factory or other large building can generally be secured and converted into temporary barracks (see Paragraph 60). If a company is assigned to or selects such a building, it should at once be thoroughly inspected by the company commander, accompanied by the mess sergeant, supply sergeant and hospital sergeant. Among the most important things to be noted are: space available for cots; ventilation; toilet facilities; general cleanliness; danger of fire; facilities for messing; space for company office; space for medical dispensary; drinking water facilities; liability to attack; heating apparatus and fuel supply. If they are not already on hand, the supply sergeant should at once provide plenty of brooms, some sweeping compound, wash basins, a couple of mops and pails, at least two closed receptacles for refuse, a plentiful supply of clean cloths or rags, and soap. If the men have

to be messed in the building, extensive further supplies will be necessary, particularly if cooking must be done on the premises.

90. Going to and From Duty.—In any prolonged tour of duty, the problem of transportation demands serious consideration. Men permitted to go to their offices during the day, or to their homes at night, must get from and to the company quarters safely and with the minimum of delay. Public conveyances, such as street-cars, can, of course, be used, but it is the duty of each company commander to see that his men run no needless risk by appearing in public alone in uniform. A man going home alone at night during a period of disorder invites attack. So far as possible, the company commander should arrange to have such of his men as are going home at night transported in automobiles or motor trucks, and brought back in the same way early the next morning. Neglect in this matter may easily result in serious and entirely avoidable casualties.

91. Routine in Quarters.—The routine of a local defense company quartered in temporary barracks during an emergency should be essentially that of the Regular Army. The duty roster should be drawn up, and all details posted on the company bulletin board. Guard should be properly mounted each day, and maintained so long as the quarters are occupied. The routine bugle calls should regularly be used, the schedule of calls being posted daily on the bulletin board. Ingress to or egress from the building should, whenever possible, be by pass only, except in the case of details on duty. Sentries

should be carefully instructed as to their special orders, which should be made as simple as possible. Everything should be done to impress on all the men the military nature of their temporary mode of life; a little extra attention to discipline and detail in barracks will be more than repaid by increased efficiency in the field. Particular emphasis should be laid on keeping the quarters properly policed; local defense volunteers are, as a rule, more eager to fight than to sweep, but, if properly encouraged, they can easily be taught to take pride in keeping their quarters always clean. Inspections should be frequent and searching.

92. Preparing for a Mob.—In dealing with a city crowd, either imminent or actual, the local defense unit commander should always be prepared for the eventuality of its getting out of hand and suddenly becoming a mob. The longer the tour of duty, the greater the likelihood of an outburst which will put the entire task on a new basis. The commander should, therefore, always hold in reserve enough men, including rifle and shotgun men (see Paragraphs 45–46), so that if he finds himself confronted with a mob in place of a crowd, he will be in a position to deal with it effectively. This applies with equal force to the commander of a detached company or platoon; he must always prepare for something worse than a crowd, while doing his utmost to prevent this something from ever developing.

93. Patrolling.—It is quite possible that the unit will be mobilized on a general threat of trouble, although no specific outbreaks have anywhere occurred. In that

case, and also throughout the entire period of any prolonged disturbance, the matter of patrolling is of the utmost importance. Disorder starts and spreads with alarming rapidity, and in a large city there is no telling where sporadic cases of it may occur. The only possible way in which the unit can adequately cover its territory is through an extensive system of patrols, maintained night and day. This is true above all when the disorder is not closely centered; in a traction strike, for instance, a unit of a few hundred men may find itself responsible for the safety of the public along scores of miles of street-car lines. Isolated cases of violence and disorder do not often lead to mobs, but they are none the less menaces to the public peace, and a stray stone or pistol shot may at any time cost one or more lives. Thorough patrolling is the only protection against this kind of danger.

94. **Motor Patrols.**—In the city, and to a great extent in the country as well, the best method of handling local defense patrols is by automobile. The ordinary open touring car will hold just the right number of men, besides the driver; no motor patrol should be of less than four men if it can possibly be helped. It can cover a great amount of ground; it is fast enough to get quickly to the scene of any trouble; it provides a convenient method for bringing in prisoners; it can, at need, be sent for reinforcements, and, also at need, it can accommodate ten or a dozen men. The foot patrol, by comparison, is slow and inefficient, and should only be used in a few crowded sections where an automobile might find itself

blocked. The system of motor patrolling should be laid out in accordance with the military districts (see Paragraph 78), and each district commander should prepare a definite time and route schedule for each patrol. Points should be designated, and times set, at which patrols should report in by telephone. Limousines should never be used for motor patrolling, as their glass is too tempting to stones or shots. The tops of touring cars used in this service should always be put back. A considerable part of the effectiveness of the motor patrol system lies in the fact that it is conspicuous; a would-be trouble-maker's ardor is considerably dampened if every few minutes he encounters a big car full of uniformed and armed men, obviously on the lookout for him.

95. Pickets.—The motor patrol system should in many cases be supplemented by the establishment of pickets at selected points within each military district. Ordinarily no company will establish more than two of these, for while important points should be strongly guarded, it is always better to leave positions without guards, and trust to the motor patrols to report and, if possible, check trouble, than to try to cover them with inadequate numbers. The picket should never be less than two full squads. It should be placed at a point, such as an important street intersection or open square, which needs constant watching; it should always be sheltered in a house or shop, and should have one or two automobiles on hand. The location of all company pickets, with their telephone numbers, should be known to all motor patrols sent out by the company

commander. The picket can frequently send out one or two foot patrols to cover the immediate neighborhood, but its force should never be widely scattered. The establishment of too many pickets weakens the company reserve, and likewise cuts down the number of men available for motor patrol duty.

96. Written Orders and Reports.—When the local defense unit is on active service, all orders should, whenever possible, be in writing, or, still better, typewritten. This applies equally to orders from the commanding officer to his battalion or company commanders and to orders from a lieutenant to a squad leader. Orders delivered by telephone or orally should be confirmed in writing at the first opportunity. In a similar way, all reports should be made or confirmed in writing. For this purpose a portable typewriter, such as the Corona (see Paragraph 61), is of very great value, as carbon copies of orders can then easily be made. All officers and noncommissioned officers should be furnished with printed order and report blanks, and instructed as to the proper manner of using them.

97. When a Crowd has Formed.—The foregoing paragraphs (72–96) refer to local defense service in the city in general, and particularly to those phases of it which exist when no large and disorderly crowd has formed. They cover what may be called the ordinary routine of crowd tactics, including the important point of preventing a crowd from forming. If, however, a crowd—not a mob—does form, the problem of the local defense unit then is to disperse it or hold it in check, to prevent it

from becoming a mob, to restrain the violence of individuals, and to accomplish all this, if possible, without bloodshed. The tactics adapted to the solution of this problem form the basis of the following paragraphs (Nos. 98-174).

98. Limiting Use of Firearms.—It may be taken as axiomatic that firearms should never be employed against a crowd, as distinct from a mob, except (a) when an individual is compelled to use his revolver in self-defense, or (b) when acts of such extreme violence have been committed by individual members of the crowd that it may be necessary to order sharpshooters to pick them off in order to prevent further mischief. In other words, the use of firearms against crowds is sharply limited to individual cases, and the crowd as a whole should never be fired on, unless, of course, it should suddenly assume the characteristics of a dangerous mob. The same principle holds good, in large measure, for the bayonet; its use against crowds is almost certain to result in bloodshed which, nine times out of ten, could and should have been avoided. The rifle butt is, of course, an exceedingly effective weapon under certain circumstances, but it, like the bayonet, inflicts nasty injuries if used with any degree of force. The object of any butt stroke is to disable the antagonist completely, whereas in dealing with a crowd the chief need is for some form of forceful persuasion, which will do its work with the minimum of casualties.

99. Moral Effect of Rifles.—It is often urged that the moral effect of rifles in crowd duty is great. This is

absolutely true when the rifles are in the hands of regular troops, or when the situation is so serious that rifle fire or bayonet charges may be used at any moment. For the local defense unit, however, the moral effect is too often just the reverse of what is intended. The crowd knows that, so long as it keeps within certain limits, the rifles will never be fired, or the bayonets used; and though at first a company with rifles and fixed bayonets may seem very impressive, the impression wears off after a few minutes of contact. There are certain definite exceptions to this: sentries, for instance, should always be armed with loaded rifles and fixed bayonets, or with loaded shotguns, and whenever a unit such as a company or battalion brings its reserve into the field, though not necessarily into action, the reserve should always include men armed with rifles and shotguns.

100. **Never Bluff.**—The whole question of proper arms for crowd or mob duty may be summed up in two words: **NEVER BLUFF.** Give your men weapons they can use, and which the crowd knows they are ready to use. It follows that an unloaded rifle or revolver on active service is little short of a crime. A unit which sends its men out to disperse a crowd with empty rifles deserves to have half of them brought back as casualties. Blank cartridges are covered by the same rule; there is absolutely no excuse for ever issuing them to men going out on active service. Nothing will do more to encourage a crowd to violence than the feeling that the force holding or attempting to hold it in check is "throwing a bluff," and rifles or even shotguns in service against a crowd, except

when held with the reserves, are always more or less patent bluffs.

101. Formations for Crowd Tactics.—With firearms thus virtually debarred from crowd tactics, the riot stick (see Paragraphs 48–49) becomes the chief offensive weapon. Since the combat tactics designed for infantry are based exclusively on the use of rifle fire and the bayonet, it follows that they cannot possibly prove altogether adapted to conditions based on absolutely different weapons. It is necessary, therefore, to devise special formations for use against crowds. The fundamental point of difference is this: that in infantry combat tactics it is essential that no man in the firing line should even partially mask a comrade so as to interfere with his field of fire. In the bayonet charge the same principle holds good; each man must have a free field for the use of his weapon, without having to fear lest he should plunge it into a comrade's back. Thus the basis of infantry combat tactics is the single deployed firing line, with supports and reserves to reënforce it, and the single deployed charging line, which may, and normally does, form one "wave" in a series, each wave being well separated from the one preceding it. Crowd tactics, on the other hand, are based on shock action and personal contact; not only is it harmless to have the men partially mask one another, but it is often an added source of power.

EXAMPLE. A platoon in skirmish line is endeavoring to clear a crowded street. Resistance is unequally distributed, and where it is stiffest the line

makes slow progress. Thus it becomes concave, and at the very points where the greatest degree of concentration is necessary to overcome resistance, the men are pulled farthest apart. There is little or no opportunity to concentrate the strength of the entire unit where it is needed, and a complete break in the line, necessitating the use of reënforcements to patch it up, may easily result.

If the platoon is in close order, the rear rank man is practically useless, because his file leader completely masks him, and he has no opportunity to bring his riot stick into play. Moreover, the front of the platoon is greatly contracted; even allowing for the guides, a platoon in close order occupies only a width of thirty-nine feet, whereas the street to be cleared may be seventy or eighty.

If, on the other hand, the platoon is in wedge (see Paragraph 109) or wedge-and-diagonal (see Figure 6) formation, every added pressure tends to bring the men closer together, and thereby strengthen the line. The men are all in contact with the crowd, and there is no injurious masking. Finally, the platoon occupies the same amount of front as in an ordinary deployed line.

102. Three Standard Formations.—For crowd tactics three standard formations should be adopted: the wedge, the diagonal, and the deployed line. The first two may be formed by a squad, section or platoon; the third may be formed by a unit of any size. The wedge is the normal offensive formation, with the diagonal primarily as an

adjunct thereto; the deployed line will be used chiefly for defensive purposes. It is identical in appearance, but not in method of formation or the relative order of the men, with the skirmish line of the Infantry Drill Regulations (School of the Squad, Paragraph 124).

THE WEDGE

103. The squad being in line, assembled, to form wedge: 1. SQUAD, 2. **Wedge**.




FIG. 1.—Squad Wedge from Line Assembled.

The squad leader gives the command, and at the command of execution springs about three paces to the front, in front of No. 3 front rank. The men, moving at a run, post themselves in two lines to his right and left rear, each man one-half pace behind and one-half pace to the right (or left) of the man ahead of him. The front-rank men are on the squad leader's right rear, No. 3 nearest him, then No. 2, then No. 1. The rear-rank men are on his left rear, No. 1 nearest him, then No. 2, then No. 3. No. 4 of the rear rank follows the squad leader, and takes position inside the wedge.

If the movement is executed from a halt, the squad leader and the men halt when they reach their proper positions; if the squad is marching in quick time, the wedge continues to advance in quick time, and

if in double time, the wedge advances in double time. The squad leader sets the wedge in motion from a halt, and regulates its gait and direction, with the command, FOLLOW ME (see Figure 1).

104. The squad being in wedge formation, to assemble in line: 1. ASSEMBLE, 2. **March.**

If at a halt, the squad leader stands fast; if marching, he halts. The men resume their proper positions with relation to the squad leader.

105. The squad being in wedge formation, marching at quick or double time, to march to the rear: 1. TO THE REAR, 2. **March.**

If marching at quick time: all the men execute *To the Rear, March* (Infantry Drill Regulations, Paragraph 72). No. 4 of the rear rank takes the double time for about six paces, when he resumes the quick time. No. 1 rear rank and No. 3 front rank take the double time till they are one-half pace to the rear and one-half pace to the right and left, respectively, of No. 4 rear rank, when they resume the quick time. No. 2 rear rank and No. 2 front rank execute the same movements with relation to, respectively, No. 1 rear rank and No. 3 front rank. No. 3 rear rank and No. 1 front rank simply execute *To the Rear, March*. The squad leader follows No. 4 rear rank, taking position inside the wedge.

If marching at double time: all the men except No. 4 rear rank assume quick time before executing *To the Rear, March*. No. 4 rear rank executes *To the Rear, March*, and continues at double time; the other men resume the double in time to take their proper relative

positions with regard to No. 4 rear rank, as indicated in the preceding paragraph.

NOTE. It will be seen from the foregoing that the squad in wedge formation, when marching to the rear, simply turns itself inside out, No. 4 of the rear rank becoming the apex of the wedge in place of the squad leader, who assumes No. 4 rear rank's normal position inside the wedge.

106. The section (two squads) being in line or column, assembled, to form wedge: 1. SECTION, 2. **Wedge.**




FIG. 2.—Section Wedge from Line Assembled.

The section leader gives the command, and at the command of execution springs about six paces to the front, in front of the center of his section. The men, moving at a run, post themselves in two lines to his right

and left rear, each man one-half pace behind and one-half pace to the right (or left) of the man ahead of him. The first (right or leading) squad is on the section leader's right rear, the second (left or rear) squad on his left rear. Each squad forms in accordance with the principles governing the deployed line in crowd tactics (Paragraph 118), the front rank on the right (Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in order from right to left), the rear rank on the left (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in order from right to left). The squad leaders are in rear of their respective squads, inside the wedge. If the movement is executed from a halt, the section leader and the men halt when they reach their proper positions; if the section is marching in quick time, the wedge continues to advance in quick time; if it is marching in double time, the section leader takes quick time until all the men are in position; the wedge then resumes double time without command. The section leader sets the wedge in motion from a halt, and regulates its gait and direction, with the command, FOLLOW ME (see Figure 2).

107. The section being in wedge formation, to assemble in line: 1. ASSEMBLE, 2. **March.**

If at a halt, No. 4 rear rank of the first (right) squad and No. 1 front rank of the second (left) squad stand fast; if marching, they halt. The squads form on them in line, No. 4 rear rank of the first squad remaining in the front rank till his squad is formed, when he drops back and the squad leader takes his proper place.

108. The section being in wedge formation, marching

at quick or double time, to march to the rear: 1. To THE REAR, 2. **March**.

The section turns inside out as prescribed for the squad (Paragraph 105), except that the section leader continues to be the apex of the wedge, and that the squad leaders pass through the line so as to retain their positions in the rear of their respective squads.

109. The wedge formation may be assumed by a platoon of four or more squads, but in general this formation will not be used, the wedge with flanking diagonals (see Figure 6) being normally more effective for so large a unit. The platoon forms a wedge by the same methods as those prescribed for the section (Paragraph 106), except that the platoon leader, before giving the command, **PLATOON, Wedge**, indicates the center of his platoon. Squads to the right or in advance of the center form on the platoon leader's right rear; those to the left or behind it form on his left rear. To assemble the platoon from wedge formation, the platoon leader commands, **ASSEMBLE, March**, and indicates the point of rest. The squad leaders bring their squads into position successively.

THE DIAGONAL

110. The squad being in line, assembled, to form diagonal: 1. **DIAGONAL, GUIDE RIGHT (LEFT), 2. March**.

If the guide is right: No. 1 front rank moves forward at a run for about six paces; No. 2 front rank follows him, and posts himself 40 inches behind No. 1. The other men form line to the left rear of No. 2 front rank, each

man one-half pace behind and one-half pace to the left of the man ahead of him. The order of the men is as for the deployed line in crowd tactics (Paragraph 118), No. 3 front rank being on the left rear of No. 2, and then, successively, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the rear rank. The



FIG. 3.—Squad Diagonal
(Guide Right) from
Line Assembled.



FIG. 4.—Squad Diagonal
(Guide Left) from Line
Assembled.

squad leader posts himself in front of No. 3 front rank. He may, if he chooses, however, post himself in front of No. 1 front rank, selecting whichever position gives him the better opportunity to lead his squad. If the movement is executed from a halt, the squad leader and the men halt when they reach their proper positions; if the squad is marching in quick or double time, the diagonal

advances at the same gait. The squad leader sets the diagonal in motion from a halt, and regulates its gait and direction, with the command, FOLLOW ME (see Figure 3).

If the guide is left: the squad leader moves forward at a run. No. 4 rear rank, followed in column by No. 3 rear rank, runs forward for about six paces; Nos. 2 and 1 of the rear rank post themselves successively to the right rear of No. 3. Nos. 3, 2 and 1 of the front rank swing to the right, posting themselves successively to the right rear of No. 1 rear rank. The squad leader takes post in front of No. 2 (or No. 4; see the preceding paragraph) of the rear rank (see Figure 4).

111. The squad being in diagonal formation, to assemble in line: 1. ASSEMBLE, 2. **March.**

The squad leader takes position in front of the squad, and halts; the men assume their proper positions with relation to the squad leader.

112. The section being in line or column, assembled, to form diagonal: 1. DIAGONAL, GUIDE RIGHT (LEFT), 2. **March.**

If the guide is right: the first (right or leading) squad executes *Diagonal, guide right, March*, as prescribed in Paragraph 110, except that the squad leader posts himself behind No. 1 of the rear rank, and that No. 1 front rank moves forward about 10 paces; the second (left or rear) squad forms successively to the left rear of the first squad, No. 1 front rank being one-half pace behind and one-half pace to the left of No. 4 rear rank of the first squad; the leader of the second squad takes post in rear of No. 1 rear rank. The section leader posts himself in

front of No. 3 front rank of the first squad. If the movement is executed from a halt, the section leader and the men halt when they reach their proper positions; if the section is marching in quick time, the diagonal continues to advance in quick time; if it is marching in double time, the section leader takes quick time until all the men are in position; the diagonal then resumes the double time without command.

If the guide is left: the second (left or rear) squad executes *Diagonal, guide left, March*, as prescribed in Paragraph 110, except that the squad leader posts himself behind No. 1 of the rear rank, and that No. 4 rear rank moves forward about 10 paces (or 12 if the diagonal is formed from column). The first (right or leading) squad forms successively to the right rear of the second squad, No. 4 rear rank being one-half pace behind and one-half pace to the right of No. 1 front rank of the first squad; the leader of the first squad takes post in rear of No. 1 rear rank. The section leader posts himself in front of No. 2 rear rank of the second squad.

113. The section being in diagonal formation, to assemble in line: 1. **ASSEMBLE**, 2. **March**.

If the diagonal is marching, it halts. No. 4 rear rank of the first (right) squad and No. 1 front rank of the second (left) squad move straight to the front till they are two paces ahead of the advanced flank of the diagonal, and then halt. The squads form on them in line, No. 4 rear rank of the first squad remaining in the front rank till his squad is formed, when he drops back and the squad leader takes his proper place.

114. The diagonal will rarely have occasion to execute *To the Rear, March*. If the movement is to be used, however, it will be executed by the same commands, and on the same principle, as prescribed for the wedge (see Paragraphs 105 and 108).

115. The diagonal formation may be assumed by a platoon of four or more squads, but in general this formation will not be used. The platoon forms a diagonal by the same methods as those prescribed for the section (Paragraph 112), the additional squads simply continuing the line to the left (or right) rear of the leading section. To assemble the platoon in line, the platoon leader commands, **ASSEMBLE, March**, and indicates the point of rest. The squad leaders bring their squads into position successively.

116. The squad or section being in diagonal formation, to form wedge: 1. **SQUAD (SECTION)**, 2. **Wedge**.

The leader takes the proper position in front of his command so as to be the apex of the wedge, when formed. The men, moving at a run, assume the relative positions indicated in Paragraphs 103 and 106. The general provisions of these two paragraphs apply equally to the wedge formed from diagonal.

Conversely, the squad or section being in wedge formation, to form diagonal: 1. **DIAGONAL, GUIDE RIGHT (LEFT)**, 2. **March**.

No. 1 front rank, right squad (if the guide is right) or No. 4 rear rank, left squad (if the guide is left) takes the proper position, and the men form on him as indicated in Paragraphs 110 and 112. The general provisions of

these two paragraphs apply equally to the diagonal formed from wedge.

THE DEPLOYED LINE

117. It is apparent from the foregoing paragraphs (103-116) that the basis for all wedge and diagonal formations is the deployment of the squad with the front rank on the right (Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in succession from right to left) and the rear rank on the left (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in succession from right to left). Any attempt to utilize the standard method of deployment, with rear rank men to the right of their file leaders, for these special formations is bound to result in confusion, as the men's paths cross each other in such a way that collisions are inevitable. In order that the deployed line formation may be assumed quickly and without confusion from close order, the wedge, or the diagonal, it is, therefore, essential that it, too, should be based on the principle of the front rank forming on the right, the rear rank on the left. Only in this way can each man always be sure of his exact position in each formation. The dissimilarity between this and the standard deployment makes a separate command desirable.

118. The squad being assembled in line, in wedge, or in diagonal, to form deployed line: 1. **DEPLOY**, 2. **MARCH**.

No. 3 front rank springs about three paces straight to the front. Moving at a run, the men place themselves at half-pace intervals to his right and left, Nos. 2 and 1 front rank successively to his right, Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4

rear rank successively to his left. The squad leader posts himself either in front of or behind the center of the squad. If the movement is executed from a halt, the men halt as they come on the line established by No. 3 front rank; if the squad is marching in quick or double time, the gait is maintained (see Figure 5).




FIG. 5.—Squad Deployed from Line Assembled.

119. The section, platoon or company being in any formation, to form deployed line: 1. **DEPLOY, GUIDE RIGHT (LEFT, CENTER),** 2. **March.**

The announcement of the guide indicates the base squad. The deployment proceeds as in the standard deployment (Infantry Drill Regulations, Paragraphs 206-210), except that each squad is deployed on the line as described in Paragraph 118.

The assembly from deployed line is likewise executed as in the standard assembly (Infantry Drill Regulations, Paragraph 211), except that each squad assembles on No. 3 front rank.

120. The wedge will be formed from the deployed line by the same commands, and according to the same principles, as from close order (Paragraphs 103 and 106), except that the leader will normally take a somewhat

greater distance to the front. The diagonal will likewise be formed from the deployed line as described in Paragraphs 110 and 112.

121. Testing the Formations.—These three formations—the wedge, the diagonal, and the deployed line—together with the normal close order formations, form an adequate basis for all crowd tactics. Their effectiveness depends very largely on the precision and speed with which they can be executed, and the steadiness with which the men can retain them in the face of opposition. They should, therefore, be constantly practiced at drill. It is an excellent plan to test them by detailing two or three squads to represent a crowd, and sending wedges and diagonals against them at both quick and double time. This practice has particular value because it is far easier to teach men to assume their positions quickly in the wedge or diagonal than it is to make them stay there when resistance is encountered. The temptation to carry on a single combat with an obstreperous opponent is often great, but every man must be made to realize that it is his duty to stay in his place, and, if personally attacked, to get rid of his opponent just as expeditiously as he can. A thrust or blow with the riot stick will generally do the business. An occasional dash of football tactics in drill, in order to try out the special crowd formations, will do much toward fitting the men to meet actual resistance with steadiness.

122. Employment of the Wedge.—The wedge is the normal offensive formation for breaking up, splitting or striking into a crowd. It will not normally, by itself,

clear a street or other open space, but it will so effectually split a crowd that clearing up whatever may be left is an easy matter. The section is the proper unit for work in the roadway of an ordinary city street, while the squad is best for the sidewalks. The squad wedge is the ideal formation for making an arrest out of a crowd—an operation which almost always provokes resistance. The wedge plunges into the crowd; the squad leader seizes the person to be arrested, and the squad executes *To the Rear, March* (see Paragraph 105). The squad leader and his prisoner are thus covered by the two flanks of the wedge. If the movement is executed, as it always should be, at a run, the chances are that the arrest will be made, and the prisoner conveyed safely away, before the crowd fully realizes what has happened.

123. **Employment of the Diagonal.**—The diagonal is chiefly for clearing a sidewalk or part of a street, generally for the purpose of obtaining an open space for further operations. A crowd on a sidewalk, or completely filling a street, is covered by the buildings on one or both flanks, and, if not pried loose, is often very hard to move. The wedge is ill adapted to this purpose, as it tends to pocket part of the crowd between one of its own flanks and the building line. The diagonal, on the other hand, works like a snowplow, sweeping every one off to one side. When used on a sidewalk for this purpose, the guide (advanced flank) of the diagonal should always be on the side next to the building line. Squad diagonals operating on the sidewalks may often be advantageously used in conjunction with a section wedge (see Figure 6).

124. **Employment of the Deployed Line.**—The deployed line in crowd tactics is chiefly a defensive formation, to be used for holding ground cleared by the wedge or diagonal. Its weakness on the offense has been previously discussed (see Paragraph 101). A deployed line




FIG. 6.—Platoon in Wedge-and-Diagonals Formation, with Platoon in Support.

is, however, often useful in support of a wedge or diagonal. When a street, street intersection or open space has been cleared, a deployed line may be used to hold the crowd back. Sometimes it is not desirable, or immediately practicable, to disperse a crowd, and the object of the commander will be attained if the crowd is simply held in check—kept on the sidewalk, for instance. In this case a deployed line should be strung along the curb, or wherever the commander has fixed the limits of the

crowd. The importance of using the form of deployment described in Paragraphs 117-120 is particularly apparent in such a situation, for it is essential that any squad or section thus deployed should be able instantly to assume the wedge formation in case a sudden offensive becomes necessary.

125. Supports.—In general, none of these special formations, with the exception of the squad wedge for making an arrest, should ever be used without an adequate support. For the wedge and diagonal the support should, as a rule, be at least equal in strength to the front line. It should follow the front line closely enough to be able to reënforce it at need without a moment's delay, and yet not so closely as to lose its own freedom of maneuver. Five to 10 paces between a squad wedge or diagonal and its supporting squad, and 10 to 15 between a section wedge or diagonal and its supporting section, may be accepted as normal. The support should march in close order unless there is good reason for not doing so, as it can be much more easily handled, particularly toward the flanks, when it is assembled than when it is in any extended formation. The leader of the support should march in advance of his command. A defensive deployed line should always have a support, but the support may often be considerably weaker than what would be required for an attacking formation (see Figure 6).

126. Reënforcements.—If an advancing wedge or diagonal encounters such resistance that it loses its momentum, or is in danger of being broken, it should be

at once and vigorously reënforced. Reënforcements should never be sent in in driblets; the entire support should be used, unless the need for help is sharply localized, in which case a squad may be sent to strengthen the point endangered. If the support is thus brought into action, it becomes the duty of the higher commander to supply a new support from his reserve. In reënforcing a wedge, diagonal or deployed line, the support should always assume the formation of the front line before coming up to it. Each man should come up to the right of the corresponding man in the front line. Reënforcement should be at double time; almost invariably what the front line needs is renewed impetus, which can best be given by a new line charging at full speed into the gaps, and by sheer weight and momentum driving the whole formation forward. To summon reënforcements, the leader of the front-line unit will call "Reënforce," or blow his whistle and execute the arm signal for double time. The leader of the support will command SQUAD (SECTION OR PLATOON), **Wedge** (or the commands for forming diagonal or deployed line, as the case may be), FOLLOW ME.

127. **Reserves.**—It is as true of crowd as of any other tactics that the commanding officer should maintain as large a reserve as possible, which he will not use until it is absolutely necessary. Having sent his reserve into action, he will take the first opportunity to form a new reserve from units temporarily disengaged, or from new units sent up from the rear. The reserve is the commanding officer's most effective means of making his will felt;

without it he is powerless in case affairs take a suddenly adverse turn. The reserve should be as strong as possible, and should include men armed with rifles and shot-guns, in case conditions become such as to necessitate a change from crowd to mob tactics. It should normally be held in close order, in a position where its flanks and rear can be readily protected. The reserve should not be dissipated by sending squads of it here and there; when used, it should be used as a unit, for the purpose of striking a crushing blow.

128. Plenty of Men Needed.—In order to provide adequately for supports and reserves, it is of the utmost importance to have plenty of men. “Never send a boy to do a man’s job” is an excellent rule for every local defense unit commander to remember—and a disorderly crowd is always a man’s job. It is not necessary, or advisable, to throw the largest possible number of men into the attack, but whenever a disorderly crowd has formed, every man of the local defense unit who can possibly be spared from other duties should be on the ground, in the front line, in support, or in reserve. On the same principle, no subordinate commander should ever hesitate for a moment about asking for reënforcements whenever he thinks he needs them. Some officers have a wholly mistaken idea that this is a sign of weakness; the real proof of weakness is the vanity which leads an officer to risk his men’s lives in order to make a grandstand play. If no reënforcements are available, the officer must do the best he can without them; but when things look threatening, he has not done his full duty by

the men under him until he has put the responsibility up to his superior.

129. **Signals.**—Because of the relatively small area covered by most of the operations against a city crowd, and the small units normally employed, it is generally possible to give all commands orally. Only the prescribed commands, supplemented by those necessary for the special formations of crowd tactics, should be used; the men should never, under any circumstances, be harangued or made to listen to prolonged explanations in the presence of the crowd. It is sometimes necessary, however, to use signals, and the men should be carefully trained to respond to them. Officers, platoon leaders and guides should be equipped with the appropriate whistles. Of the prescribed arm signals, those for *Forward, March; Halt; Double time, March; Squads right (left), March; Squads right about (or To the rear), March; Column right (left), March; Assemble, March; Squad, and Platoon,* are the most useful. To these may be added the following, for the special formations:

Wedge. Raise both hands to the shoulders, fists closed; thrust diagonally forward and outward, repeating the movement several times.

Diagonal. Raise both arms laterally, one 45 degrees above the horizontal, the other 45 degrees below it (compare position of letter "L" in two-arm semaphore code). The arm raised higher than the other will indicate the guide.

Deployed Line. Raise both arms laterally until horizontal (as in signaling *As skirmishers, March*), but bring

the hands back to the shoulders and then thrust laterally again. Repeat several times. To announce the guide, hold the arm on the side of the guide steady, executing the movement of the hand to and from the shoulder with the other arm.

Section. Extend the arm horizontally toward the section leader; swing the hand from side to side from the wrist.

Reënforce. Same as *Double time, March.*

Company commanders and platoon leaders may find it expedient for signaling at night to equip themselves with small pocket flash lights.

130. Precision of Movement.—In crowd tactics the small unit—squad, section and platoon—is all-important; conditions are rarely such that whole companies can be long held together for use in a single field. For this reason it is essential that the lieutenants, sergeants and squad leaders should be real leaders, possessing the confidence of their men and capable of handling them to the best possible advantage. They should be able to give their commands with decision and vigor, and in the field should never consult with their men as to the proper course of action. Every movement, when in face of a crowd, should be executed with precision and energy, and only the prescribed movements, in which the men have been trained, should be employed. The small units will follow their commanders far better in an emergency if they have had frequent drill under them, detached from the rest of their company. Nothing encourages a crowd more than to see a squad or section in which the

discipline has broken down, and which its leader is no longer able to handle with clear and simple commands. "Get back in line, fellows," may mean the same thing as "ASSEMBLE, **March,**" but its effect, both on the crowd and on the men themselves, is astonishingly different.

131. **Responsibility of Officers.**—The officers must never permit themselves to forget their responsibilities when dealing with a disorderly crowd. This is particularly true of the company commanders. Often the temptation to "get into the scrap" is so strong as to seem almost irresistible, but no officer has a right to put himself in a position whence he cannot control his men. If a unit is ordered to charge, the commander's place is, of course, at the head of it; at such a time the command FOLLOW ME has the utmost significance. Ordinarily, however, the officer must make up his mind to forego any actual contact with the crowd, and post himself both where he can direct the work of his men and where he can readily be communicated with by his superiors. The officer who is carried away by his ardor, and plunges into the crowd so as to be separated from his men, thereby shows that his proper place is in the ranks.

132. **Application of Crowd Tactics.**—The foregoing paragraphs (101–131) have outlined what may be called the machinery of crowd tactics; they embody the general principles, the application of which will vary widely according to conditions. We may now assume an actual situation, and see how this machinery may be set in motion and employed by the commander of a local defense unit.

133. The General Situation.—Suppose that, in a manufacturing center of considerable size, a strike has been declared by the workmen employed in half a dozen great textile mills. The action of the workmen has been sudden, with the result that large crowds have collected on the streets near the mills before anything could be done to scatter them. There is in the city a local defense battalion of four companies (158 officers and enlisted men each). The commanding officer is at once notified of the situation by the civil authorities, and is directed to mobilize his battalion and take such measures as he deems necessary for the maintenance of order. He forthwith gets into communication with the adjutant, and orders him to summon the entire staff immediately to headquarters. He then draws up his plan of action, assigning each company to such duty as the nature of the situation suggests, and—unless the adjutant has already reported for duty—himself telephones to the four company commanders. His orders will include a brief statement of the situation and information as to the immediate mission of each company.

134. The Mission of the Company.—We will assume that the largest crowd of strikers is gathered in front of the America mill, which occupies an entire block between two broad streets, Washington and Grant, and two narrow ones, Fourth and Fifth. The crowd has congregated mainly on Grant street, filling it so completely that the street cars can no longer make their way through, and are being re-routed. The mill is in the military district assigned to Company A, and the commanding



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A Dangerous Stage, but Still a Case for Vigorous Crowd Tactics

officer's orders to the Company A commander, Captain Smith, direct him to mobilize his company and proceed at once to disperse the crowd. Captain Smith receives the order at 6 p. m., at which time he knows that most of his men will be at home. His first step is to formulate his plan of action, after which he will set his notification system in operation.

135. The Point of Mobilization.—His first problem is that of approaching the crowd. He has clearly no time to lose; therefore he cannot afford to mobilize his company at some distant point, and transport it thence as a unit to the scene of action. On the other hand, he cannot risk letting his men arrive at or near the mill in small groups. The mill being in his district, he is thoroughly familiar with the locality; and as there is a small park about seven blocks from the mill, with two or three large garages adjoining it, he selects this park as the point of mobilization. His telephoned orders to his two lieutenants and the first sergeant (see Paragraph 21) will, therefore, run as follows:

“A general strike of textile workers has begun, with a big crowd on Grant Street at the America mill. Company A will mobilize at once at Grant Park. Men will bring all arms, and equipment for one night. In coming to Grant Park they will avoid the vicinity of the mill.”

136. The Immediate Situation.—Captain Smith next calls up the mill office, and learns that the crowd is very disorderly, that stones have been thrown through windows, and that a few operatives leaving the mill have been roughly handled, but that no shots have been fired.

He then gets into his uniform, and as soon as the member of his company assigned to drive him reports, he hastens to Grant Park. Soon his men begin to come in, and among them a few, not regular members of the company, in civilian clothes (see Paragraph 77). Some of these he sends down to the scene of disorder, where they will attract no attention, with orders to notify him at once concerning conditions there. As soon as he has received their report, he notifies headquarters, reporting the situation, his own location, the number of men already mobilized, and stating where he can be reached by telephone. By this time—perhaps half an hour after Captain Smith received the first order—about half his company has arrived, and the rest are coming in rapidly.

137. Approaching the Crowd.—The situation at the mill is such as to demand immediate action. Captain Smith determines, therefore, to take his half company at once to the scene. He can cover the seven blocks by using his automobiles or trucks, or by marching. The cars and trucks are quicker, but their use involves getting out and forming in face of the crowd, and without protection. He decides, therefore, to march his men to the mill, and let the trucks bring up the other half company, a section or two at a time, as fast as they report. The platoons already on the ground will then cover the process of forming. He quickly arranges his men in squads, leaves a detail at one of the Grant Park garages, and marches in close order down Grant Street. His leading squad is thrown forward as an advance guard, and on each sidewalk, alongside of his column, are three or four

riflemen, watching the opposite windows and housetops, and covering each street crossing. The advance is made at quick time, in order to save the men.

138. The First Contact.—As Captain Smith comes down Grant Street, he sees the turbulent crowd filling the whole width of the street ahead of him. His orders are specific: to disperse it. With his half company, he has not enough men for the task, yet, having come within sight of the crowd, he cannot afford to appear to hesitate. Disorderly as the gathering is, nothing is happening that would in any way justify an order to open fire; nine-tenths of the crowd are clearly excited spectators rather than violent rioters. The situation must be handled by crowd, not mob, tactics.

139. The Flank of the Crowd.—The main gate of the factory is in the middle of the Grant Street side, and this fact suggests a plan of action. It is true of crowd tactics, as of any other, that the enemy's weakest points are his flanks, but the flanks of a crowd are determined, not by the direction in which it happens to be facing or marching, but by its shape. This is true because a crowd changes direction without the slightest difficulty, by merely facing to the right or left. Ordinarily a street crowd has two short sides and two long ones. No matter how it may be facing, the short sides are far stronger than the long ones, partly because pressure against either one of them is resisted by the entire length of the crowd, and partly because, if the crowd starts to move in a body, it will almost always do so with one or other of its short sides in advance. A crowd not in solid motion,

therefore, can hardly be said to have any rear at all; it has two potential heads—the two short sides—and two flanks. The fact that it may be—and generally is—facing to one of these flanks does not alter the tactical situation, except to suggest that the flank away from which it is facing is the best point of attack. In the case of the hypothetical crowd on Grant Street in front of the America mill, the flanks are the two long sides parallel to the front of the mill, the main gate just mentioned being opposite the center of one flank. If there were an alley opposite this gate, and exposing the center of the crowd's other flank, this would be the ideal place for an attack; but as no such alley exists, Captain Smith determines to make use of the mill gate.

140. Getting under Cover.—Accordingly, without halting, he marches his half company down Grant Street to the corner of Fourth, changes direction and swings up Fourth Street, his deployed leading squad, together with his flanking riflemen, serving as a screen at the turn. The mill has a smaller entrance on Fourth Street, in front of which he halts his men, has the door thrown open, and marches in with five of his eight squads. His riflemen are posted as sentries round the Fourth Street door, with two squads drawn up in line, assembled, at right angles across the sidewalk and into the street. The effect of all this on the crowd is at once perceptible. It is not in direct contact with the guards on Fourth Street, but it observes them; it knows that a considerable body of troops has entered the factory, where it is screened from observation, and can prepare unobserved

for its next move. Already a few of the more prudent members of the crowd are beginning to slink quietly away, but the general clamor rather increases than grows less.

141. Preliminary Orders and Reports.—Once inside the mill, Captain Smith's first act is to take possession of the telephone branch exchange, to which he assigns a noncommissioned officer. He directs the lieutenant who is with him to call up the other lieutenant, who has remained at the garage adjoining Grant Park, and tell him to send the trucks with the remaining men of the company, as fast as they turn up, to the Fourth Street entrance to the mill. He orders the mess sergeant to see that hot coffee and sandwiches, and any further food readily procurable, are on hand at the mill within an hour; if the mill has a kitchen and lunch room for its employees, this detail will be easily cared for. He orders the supply sergeant to secure as many cots as possible; the company trucks can later be used to bring these to the mill. He himself telephones to headquarters, reporting that he is safely inside the mill, and that he plans to attack the crowd outside within 15 or 20 minutes. He states that conditions are not as yet dangerous, but recommends that a full equipment of rifles, bayonets and ammunition from the battalion reserve supply be loaded on a powerful truck, and held under guard at headquarters, ready to be sent to him at a moment's notice.

142. Arrival of Reënforcements.—Meanwhile a motor truck comes at full speed down Grant Street and turns the corner into Fourth. Beside the driver are two uni-

formed men armed with shotguns. The truck stops, and men spring down from it, a couple of dozen of them, and rapidly form in close order. The crowd might perhaps have tried to interfere, but the operation is covered by the two squads in line outside the Fourth Street door, and by the sentries armed with rifles. The newcomers enter the factory. Soon another truck comes up and unloads; then the first, which has gone back to Grant Park, returns with still more men. The crowd is a good deal impressed; it has no way of knowing when this stream of reënforcements will end, and the rapidity of the movements is disconcerting. Above all, the men are disappearing into the mill as fast as they arrive; the crowd knows that something startling is likely to happen before long, but, because of its inability to see the troops inside the mill, it cannot possibly figure out just what form that something will assume.

143. The Plan of Action.—When Captain Smith has fourteen squads mobilized, he determines to act at once. He therefore withdraws his guards from outside the Fourth Street door, notifying the Grant Park garage to hold all further late comers there pending subsequent orders. He calls together his platoon and section leaders, and, with paper and pencil, explains to them carefully his plan of action. While he would prefer, if possible, to scatter the entire crowd at one blow, he decides that he has not men enough to attempt this, and will therefore split the crowd into two sections, dispersing one section at a time. Having satisfied himself that every platoon and section leader understands just what is

expected of him, he forms the company in column of squads, the head close to the main gate of the mill, orders the gate to be thrown open, and commands, FORWARD, DOUBLE TIME, **March.**

144. **The Wedge Attack.**—The first squad takes the wedge formation as it clears the gate, and, supported by




FIG. 7.—Clearing a Street in Front of a Mill. First Phase of the Operations Described in Paragraphs 144–147. (The dotted areas are those occupied by the crowd.)

the second squad, likewise in wedge formation, in order to be able to reënforce instantly, drives squarely across the street to the opposite building line. The crowd, taken by surprise, splits, and a clear path is opened. Having crossed the street, the two squads execute *To the Rear, March*, and then halt and assemble in close order (see Figure 7).

145. **The Holding Line.**—The second section, following close on the heels of the first, comes out in column of squads, at the double. As it reaches the middle of the street it executes *Squads right, March*, and then *Deploy, guide center, March*, halting as the deployment is completed. Its mission is to hold in check the half of the crowd to the right of the path cut by the first section. The first section, as it re-forms in close order, becomes the support for the deployed second section (see Figure 7).

146. **The Wedge-and-Diagonals.**—The second platoon (four squads), comprising the third and fourth sections, follows the second section out through the gate, likewise at the double. Its first squad advances to the opposite sidewalk, where its leader commands, **LEFT TURN, March**, and then, **DIAGONAL, GUIDE RIGHT, March. Follow me.** The second and third squads of the platoon execute *Squads left* in the middle of the street, and then form a section wedge; the fourth squad executes *Left turn* on the nearer sidewalk, and then *Diagonal, guide left*. The entire formation plunges into the crowd at top speed, using its riot sticks freely when resistance is encountered, but depending primarily on its own momentum. The third platoon (three squads) emerges on the heels of the second, executes *Squads left*, and follows the wedge and diagonals up the street in support. Finally, the fourth platoon (three squads), including the rifle and shotgun men, comes out and halts in line near the mill gate, to be held there as the reserve (see Figure 7).

147. **The Return Attack.**—The suddenness and swiftness of the movement have caught the crowd utterly by

surprise; the wedge and diagonals drive up Grant Street to the corner of Fourth, the supports cleaning up any troublesome members of the crowd who may be left behind. At the corner the second platoon halts and its first two squads deploy across the street; its third and fourth squads assemble in support behind the deployed line. The third platoon executes *Squads right about*; its first




FIG. 8.—Clearing a Street in Front of a Mill. Second Phase of the Operations Described in Paragraphs 144–147. (The dotted areas are those occupied by the crowd.)

and second squads form section wedge in the roadway, while its third forms a diagonal (guide right) on the sidewalk adjoining the mill; and the whole platoon charges down the street at the half of the crowd not yet attacked. The deployed line holding this part of the crowd in check (the second section, with the first section in support) assembles on the far sidewalk in time to clear the road

for the charging wedge; one squad forms a diagonal (guide left) on the far sidewalk, and joins in the advance, while the other three squads form the support, advancing behind the wedge and diagonals in close order. Arriving at the corner of Fifth Street, two squads are deployed across Grant Street, with two more in support, and the rest of the company (six squads) not used for holding the crowds back at the two corners is assembled in line in front of the mill gate (see Figure 8).

148. Final Reënforcements.—Captain Smith now sends a man to telephone to the garage at Grant Park, directing that the remaining two squads (less half a dozen men armed with shotguns to remain on guard over the automobiles left in the garages) be brought to the mill by motor truck, the driver to avoid Grant Street, and reach the Fourth Street door by another route. When the truck appears, two squads are sent to cover the entrance to the mill. The company now has its full sixteen squads mobilized, and already the first victory has been won without bloodshed: the crowd has been driven from the front of the mill.

149. Advancing the Defensive Lines.—The next step is to advance the lines across the street intersections, so that the four streets adjoining the mill—Washington, Grant, Fourth and Fifth—may be kept clear. Captain Smith takes the corners one by one, using section wedges for each advance. Since the crowd, though split in two, and considerably reduced by desertion, is still mainly on Grant Street, he uses two squads for the deployed line across this street, 50 yards or so beyond the corner of

Fourth, and another two squads across it an equal distance below the corner of Fifth. A squad holds Fourth Street below the corner of Grant, and another holds Fifth in the same way; a single squad in support at each intersection backs up the deployed lines. This accounts for eight squads. There has been little or no trouble along Washington Street, so a couple of squads patrolling the intersections of Fourth and Fifth with Washington will suffice to keep this section clear. The mill is now effectually isolated from the crowd at all points.

150. **The First Patrols.**—It is next desirable to open Grant Street to street car and other traffic. The chances are that the crowd will be sufficiently disheartened to make this relatively simple; a section wedge from the reserve, with a squad in support, will suffice to drive the crowd to the sidewalks. From this point on a few motor patrols will prove useful; half a dozen cars running rapidly up and down the street the length of the three or four blocks chiefly affected, and keeping close to the curbs, will maintain the roadway open, and will probably soon enable Captain Smith to withdraw a good half of his men deployed in defensive positions. He is now in a situation where he can afford to await developments; if the motor patrols are proving effective, he can increase their number and leave to them the main part of the work, holding a strong reserve assembled outside the main gate of the mill, one squad at the intersection of Grant and Fourth Streets, and another at Grant and Fifth. He will thus have perhaps four squads engaged in motor patrolling, four in the reserve, two as sentry

squads at the main intersections, and one more doing sentry duty about the mill. This will give his remaining five squads a chance to get something to eat (see Paragraph 141), after which they can relieve squads on duty, and the entire company can finally be fed.

151. The Last of the Crowd.—With the situation thus well in hand, Captain Smith makes a full report to headquarters, and receives his orders regarding his subsequent actions. If he is watchful, the crowd is not likely to assemble again; every threatening gathering will be immediately dispersed by a motor patrol, squad wedge or section wedge. When all the men have eaten, there will be five squads available as foot patrols, and these, in addition to the motor patrols, should be able to keep the situation at all times well under control. Deprived of any opportunity to unite or to make serious trouble, the crowd, or what is left of it, is more than likely to dwindle away, leaving Captain Smith free by 10 or 11 o'clock to make his dispositions for the night. These dispositions will, of course, depend on how the general strike situation has developed, but presumably the whole of Company A will sleep at the mill, and maintain through the night three or four motor patrols in addition to the necessary guards.

152. Summary of Principles.—It is not to be assumed that the method of handling a street crowd outlined in the foregoing paragraphs (133–151) is in any sense a standard one; conditions vary so widely that it is impossible to draw up any rules for the application of crowd tactics which will cover every case. The hypothetical

example, however, has brought out certain principles which may be accepted as fundamental. These principles, stated in the form of generalizations, are enumerated in the following paragraphs (153-168).

153. **Mobilization.**—Do not mobilize at the point of danger, unless you are sure of reaching it well in advance of the crowd. On the other hand, mobilize as near it as you safely can.

154. **Information.**—Do not neglect to secure full information as to the size, temper and formation of a crowd before you approach it. This information can best be secured through men out of uniform but attached to the local defense unit. Do not place too much reliance on the reports of chance observers; they may be seeking to mislead you, or they may be suffering more or less from hysteria.

155. **Automobiles.**—Be sure that your chosen mobilization point provides adequate means for sheltering your company's automobiles, and never leave these automobiles without a guard.

156. **Advance.**—Do not approach a disorderly crowd until you have enough men in hand to accomplish something, but do not wait for every man to report, if the situation is serious. Always make full provision for bringing up the late comers.

157. **Detraining.**—In approaching a disorderly crowd, do not use automobiles or motor trucks, much less street cars, if it involves detraining without protection. Once you have enough men on the scene of action to cover the operation, the use of automobiles and trucks, par-

ticularly the latter, for bringing up reënforcements is most effective.

158. **Security.**—When marching in the vicinity of a crowd, always look to the security of the column. It should be preceded by an advance guard, and its flanks should be well covered, preferably by riflemen.

159. **Decision.**—When you come close to a crowd, do something decisive at once. Never halt your command and thereby give the appearance of indecision. If you cannot attack at once, occupy some position which may be used as a base for attack later. In any event, keep your men moving. Conversely, keep under cover until you are ready to strike.

160. **Surprise.**—Surprise is of great value in attacking a crowd. If you can strike at it from an unexpected angle, or at an unexpected moment, your task will be made much easier. In your preliminary survey of the tactical situation, always consider whether a surprise attack is possible.

161. **Force.**—Make your first blow a hard one, using your full force, except for the necessary reserves. Do not encourage the crowd by experimental attacks.

162. **Flanks.**—Remember that the flanks of a street crowd are always its long sides, whatever way it may be facing. If you attack on one of the short sides, you will have to push against the whole mass of the crowd; if you attack on a long side, you will encounter far less resistance, and often can split the crowd in two or more parts.

163. **Division.**—Do not attempt more than you can thoroughly accomplish with the force you have in hand,

making full allowance for the requisite supports and reserves. If the crowd is too large to be dealt with as a whole, split it into two or more parts, and disperse the parts separately.

164. **Plan.**—Formulate your plan of action before you strike, see that your subordinates clearly understand it, and then stick to it.

165. **Reports.**—Keep in close touch with headquarters, and see that your subordinates on detached duty keep in close touch with you. Often a report that everything is quiet is exactly the most useful information that can be sent in.

166. **Position.**—Whenever possible, split a crowd so that its two or more sections cannot coöperate, while your own unit has the great advantage of working on interior lines. In extending these lines, be careful not to lose the strength which the interior position affords.

167. **Patrols.**—When a crowd is once definitely broken, use patrols, and particularly motor patrols, extensively to keep the streets open, and direct them to break up immediately any threatening groups which may form.

168. **Concentration.**—Never scatter your forces widely, but hold them together. When many patrols are out, be sure you have a strong reserve, with means for its rapid transportation, in case of trouble. Do not send your men out singly or in groups of two or three to guard street cars, trucks, freight or passenger cars, but use motor patrols of at least four men for this service. A man on a street car or passenger car is in a peculiarly poor position to protect either it or himself.

169. **Holding a Crowd in Check.**—It is often sufficient to hold a crowd in check, without immediately dispersing it. In such a case, get it out of the roadway, where it can block traffic, and back on the sidewalk, using a deployed line with supports, or motor patrols, or both, to hold it there. In the event of disorder on the sidewalk, clear it with a strong diagonal, using a deployed line or a second diagonal to clean up the street after it.

170. **Reserves with Firearms.**—Always prepare for mob violence, and show the crowd that you are ready for it, by having your rifle and shotgun men where they can be used instantly. If the situation looks serious, arrange for a supply of rifles, bayonets and ammunition, to be held ready for instant delivery.

171. **Crowd in Open Space.**—If the crowd has formed, not in the streets, but in an open space, such as a park, freight yard, common, etc., the tactics to be employed will depend largely on the nature of the ground. In every case, however, the local defense unit commander should select a base, and drive the crowd away from it. A crowd gathered in an open space is generally far less compact than one of the same size collected in a street; as a result deployment can be at greater intervals, and, the pressure at any given point being less, the deployed line can be used far more freely than in the street. In any open space, particular attention should be paid to such features as detached houses, sheds, freight cars on sidings, etc., which may afford shelter and support to sections of the crowd. In general, if the crowd in an open space is dense, it is better to split it and disperse it piecemeal; if it is not

compact, it is better to sweep it in one direction, thereby disposing of the whole crowd at once.

172. Protecting Flanks and Rear.—In operating against a crowd in any open space, particular attention must be paid to the security of the flanks and rear. In city streets a crowd has little facility of movement, but in an open space parts of it can move about freely. The supports of an advancing line can normally take care of the rear, but the flanks should be covered by special flank guards. Shotgun men may profitably be used with the flank guards, for if a flank attack develops at all, it is likely to be of so determined and vicious a nature as to justify an order to open fire.

173. The Order to Fire.—With regard to opening fire, the men of a local defense unit should be instructed that the revolver or pistol is the only weapon they are authorized to discharge without the express order of an officer. The revolver or pistol may be discharged only in a case of urgent necessity, when there is immediate personal danger. It must always be aimed at a definite person, never discharged blindly into a crowd. Sentries and patrols will receive special orders from their officers with regard to the use of rifles and shotguns. Sharpshooters will, as a rule, receive their special orders direct from the company commander. No officer will give his men the order to fire on a crowd unless the unit has been attacked, and presumably not unless members of the crowd have begun to shoot.

174. Use of Fire Hose.—A thoroughly disorderly street crowd can sometimes be disposed of by the use of

fire hose. It is well for the local defense unit commander to make arrangements with the fire department whereby, at need, an engine and hose cart can be sent to the scene of action. If this method is used, it is the duty of the local defense unit to provide full protection for the firemen, and also to guard the entire length of the hose, to prevent its being cut. The best point of attack for fire hose is like that for attack by troops: the middle of one of the long sides of a street crowd. The danger of this method is that it may lead to a counter-attack on the fire engines and firemen, which can be beaten off only with shotguns or pistols, thus producing bloodshed which might have been avoided.

175. The Moment for Mob Tactics.—Paragraphs 173 and 174 have brought the disorderly crowd to the border line of the mob. There is no absolute rule whereby the local defense unit commander can tell when the efficacy of crowd tactics is at an end, and the need for mob tactics begins; but in general the use of firearms against the troops will be the determining factor. Practically every disorderly assembly that has not reached the shooting stage is a crowd, not a mob, and should be dealt with by crowd tactics. Once the bullets begin to fly, however, the further maintenance of crowd tactics is nothing short of a criminal risk of life. Of course, a single shot does not make a mob; such a case is the proper opportunity for a sharpshooter. It is when the commanding officer sees that many of the men facing him have firearms, and are ready to use them, that the time for mob tactics has arrived.

176. **Mob Fire Tactics.**—With mob tactics the wedge and diagonal pass into uselessness, and the deployed line is the tactical basis. Many of the general provisions of the preceding paragraphs, however, still apply; the chief differences are in the formations employed and the methods of striking. Mob tactics differ from crowd tactics also in this, that a battle with a mob is almost sure to be short, sharp and decisive, whereas it may take a considerable time to dispose of a crowd. Unless a mob has thrown up barricades, or fortified itself inside a building or group of buildings, a few volleys are likely to crush it.

177. **The Attack on a Mob.**—A mob should always be attacked, if possible, on two sides at once. An attack from one side only has the effect of merely crushing that front, without breaking the mass of the mob. On the other hand, an attack from three sides provides too little opportunity to get away for those who should be allowed to escape. Moreover, an attack from three sides involves the danger of exposing men to fire from their own comrades. If a street mob has formed before the local defense unit reaches the ground, it should be approached by parallel streets, so that, when one platoon or company halts and deploys, the other can proceed till it can turn into a cross street, and so attack the mob in flank. If the mob has formed because of the failure of applied crowd tactics, the commander should at once endeavor to send a flanking force from his unit to work round to a position whence it can deliver a flanking attack.

178. **Weapons for Mob Work.**—The shotgun is the most effective weapon in the hands of a local defense unit for dealing with a mob. Its effective range is considerably greater than that of the revolver, the usual weapon of the mob, and its spreading discharge covers a wide target. The service rifle, except in the hands of exceedingly well-trained men, is far too dangerous for city work. Moreover, it is neither necessary nor desirable to kill many members of a mob; a wounded man is just as discouraging to his fellows, for the time being, as a dead one. As for the bayonet, it looks well, but it involves something of the element of bluff which it is most important to avoid. If a bayonet charge is pushed home, the casualties will be as numerous and as severe as if three or four volleys had been fired, not to mention the fact that some of the charging men are pretty sure to be brought down by pistol shots. If the charge is not pushed home, the bayonets will have been fixed merely for effect. Army Regulations state that “as a general rule the bayonet alone should be used against mixed crowds in the first stage of a revolt.” This may be true in the case of regular troops, although so competent an authority as Major Moss disputes it (“Officers’ Manual,” Paragraph 574), but the case of a local defense unit is by no means parallel. The “first stage” referred to has presumably been covered by crowd tactics, with the riot stick playing the part assigned to the bayonet. The shotgun has not been until recently an Army weapon, but it can be placed in the hands of the members of a local defense unit with perfect propriety, and against a mob it is likely to accom-

plish far more than either the bayonet or the rifle. The pistol or revolver as an offensive weapon against a mob is, of course, an absurdity.


179. **Getting it Over Quickly.**—The object of the local defense unit commander in dealing with a mob should be to settle the affair with the minimum of delay. He should permit no desultory shooting; the firing should be by volley, and at his command only. Above all, he should never try to deceive the mob as to his intentions by threatening to fire and then withholding the order, or by firing over the heads of the mob. Once he has made up his mind to employ mob tactics, he should lose no time in deploying his men, calling on the mob to disperse, and, if his order is not promptly obeyed, giving the command to fire.

180. **Books of Reference.**—The subject of mob tactics differs from that of crowd tactics in having been extensively and authoritatively discussed by various writers on military affairs. Since the province of the present manual is primarily to consider only those features of local defense work which have not been fully covered elsewhere, no attempt is here made to go into detail regarding the special features of mob tactics. Instead, the reader is referred to Major James A. Moss's "Riot Duty" (essentially a reprint of Chapter XXVIII of his "Officers' Manual"), to Chapter XIV of Colonel Lincoln C. Andrews' "Fundamentals of Military Service," to General Albert Ordway's "Street Riot Duty," and to Paragraph 489 of the "Regulations for the Army of the United States." Major Moss's "Riot Duty," a 32-page

pamphlet, is particularly valuable. In consulting these books, however, it must always be remembered that the writers make no distinction between crowd and mob tactics, and that, for one occasion in the city where such mob tactics as they describe are actually necessary, there are probably fifty wherein crowd tactics, promptly and effectively employed, are sufficient to forestall the need for more violent measures.

181. Service in Open Country.—When the local defense unit is designed for service, either occasionally or altogether, in the open country outside of towns and cities, then the situation is radically changed. The riot stick, the wedge and the diagonal become nearly useless, and the highly developed mobilization system is of relatively little importance. The unit will take the field like any other military unit, and its proper weapon is the service rifle, although shotguns are often useful, and the unit should endeavor to have a reserve supply of them. The tactics to be used are those of the Infantry Drill and Field Service Regulations, and these should be the text-books most carefully studied.

182. Scout Duty.—Outside of cities and towns, however, the local defense unit will as a rule have little to do. Its work will be confined to small groups—a squad or section sent out to round up a criminal, arrest a suspect or investigate a crime. Thus the chief need for instruction will be in the technique of scouting, for which Colonel W. H. Waldron's "Scouting and Patrolling" is particularly to be recommended. If serious trouble develops,



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No Longer Subjects for Crowd Tactics

it is almost sure to be in a city or town, a village perhaps, where men can readily congregate. Once a crowd gathers, whether it be in a mining village or a metropolis, the general principles of crowd and mob tactics prevail; a pitched battle between large groups in the open country is so remote a possibility that the normal local defense unit need waste little time in preparing for it. Preparation for service in the open country should, rather, be in the nature of training in the special duties and methods of army scouts.

183. **Mounted Men.**—It is more than possible, nevertheless, that the real future of the local defense unit, particularly after the war is at an end, lies in just this sort of work. The need for efficient state constabularies has been growing steadily more apparent, and the Pennsylvania State Constabulary and, more recently, the New York State Troopers, have demonstrated the way in which such organizations should be developed. For them, as presumably for all permanent units designed to protect large areas, the horse is an absolute essential; this form of local or home defense is first of all a cavalry problem. The troopers may be, and normally should be, supported by reserve forces of both infantry and artillery; but in the open country, where the automobile is often at a serious disadvantage, and sometimes cannot be used at all, the effectiveness of the mounted man remains supreme. The volunteer local defense unit is practically incapable of maintaining any sort of an efficient cavalry force, partly because of the difficulty and cost of securing suitable horses, and partly because a


horse not fully trained to this particular kind of work is very much worse than no horse at all. In crowd or mob duty the risk run by a few scattered mounted men is all out of proportion to the good they can do, and if their horses are improperly trained they are a menace to every one. No more effective way of dispersing a thoroughly disorderly crowd has ever been discovered than a charge of cavalry or mounted police, but the numbers must be considerable and the training of both men and horses excellent. In general, unless the local defense unit is in a position to put in the field a carefully trained mounted unit of not less than 50 men, it should leave the matter entirely alone, and trust to its motor patrols for much of the work that would, under ideal conditions, be done by mounted men.

184. **Guarding Property.**—Except for scouting and police duty, on which small units only are likely to be sent, the most important work of any local defense organization outside of towns and cities will presumably be the guarding of property. If a mine, mill, aqueduct, dam, power station, bridge or any similar property is threatened, the local defense unit may properly be entrusted with its protection. When a long stretch is to be covered—as when guarding a railway or power line, an aqueduct or an important road—motor patrols generally supply the most effective means of affording protection, with pickets or even stronger units at commanding positions. Flat cars may often be used to carry strong patrols over stretches of track to be guarded; the car carrying the troops, or, better still, the engine, should




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How not to Guard a Train: a Fine Target for Concealed Snipers



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National Guardsmen, with Bayonets Fixed, Covering the Approach to a Factory



always be preceded by an empty car, in case explosives should be put on the tracks. The flat car expedient is to be recommended only in case the stretch of track is excessively long, or is not paralleled most of the distance by a highway. Whenever possible, the guards should keep near the track, aqueduct, etc., rather than actually on it. The same is true of a bridge; if the abutments and piers are properly guarded, a patrol on the bridge itself will have little to do.

185. Guarding Buildings.—If the property to be guarded consists of a house, enclosure or group of houses, the general principles of interior tactics (see Paragraph 69) obtain, whether the property is in the heart of a crowded city or isolated in the country. The first of these principles is that the proper place to guard a building or group of buildings is on the outside; an interior defense should be resorted to only in the gravest emergencies, when outside positions are no longer tenable. If possible, a cleared area should be established all round the property, with outposts and sentries to prevent all unauthorized persons from approaching too close. In the city the block in which the property is situated should be thus isolated (see Paragraph 149); in open country the patrol lines should be so far advanced as to keep intruders at least out of pistol range. The principles governing the establishment of outposts and patrols around property in open country are essentially the same as those covering camp outposts (Infantry Drill Regulations, Paragraphs 678–707; Field Service Regulations, Paragraphs 60–83).

186. **Interior Defense.**—The defense of a building from the inside should be regarded purely as a temporary expedient, resorted to either because of the overwhelming strength of the assailants or as a preliminary to establishing exterior guards and a cleared area. The defenders should always plan to seize the first opportunity for a determined counter-attack. They should pay particular attention to any adjoining or neighboring buildings high enough to command the property to be guarded; if there is any possibility of explosives or stones being thrown from the roofs or upper windows of these on the defenders, they should be included within the guarded area. When a building or enclosure must be defended from within, the doors and windows, particularly on the ground floor, should be strongly barricaded, except that one or two doors should be left available for egress in the event of a counter-attack. Loopholes should be made at commanding points, care being taken to see that they are not so low that they can be used from outside. The object of the defenders should be to see that no point close to the walls is sheltered from fire. Sharpshooters on the roof, particularly if there is a sheltering cornice or parapet, can do much to hold off an attack. In case there is any danger of the supply of water, electric current or gas being cut off, the defenders should arrange for a reserve supply of water, in tanks or pails, and should have plenty of candles or lamps. They should likewise have enough food to enable them to stand a siege of two or three days. Fire extinguishers are an important part of the garrison's equipment.

187. Weapons for Guarding Property.—In all forms of defending property, rifles and shotguns are the proper weapons of the local defense unit. Exterior guards may be armed with riot sticks, but motor patrols, sentries, and all troops on garrison duty should be armed for work at long range. This type of service involves little question of crowd tactics; the property under guard is to be protected either against a mob or, more frequently, against small bands of lawbreakers. In either case shooting is justified by any attack or refusal to obey the order to halt.

188. Attacking a Building.—When the situation is reversed, and the problem is to enter a building, the task of the local defense unit is exceedingly difficult and dangerous. If the building is strongly enough built to be impervious to rifle bullets, and the occupants are known to be armed, the case is one for a three-inch field piece. The wise procedure for a local defense unit is to surround the building, so as to prevent the occupants from escaping or securing supplies, and then wait for the civil authorities to secure the aid of the nearest battery of field artillery. In the city, however, even a very solidly constructed building can sometimes be successfully attacked with rifle fire if the assailants can secure commanding and well screened positions on the roofs of neighboring and higher buildings. Cases such as the foregoing are rare, but their possibility must always be taken into consideration. The situation is thus summed up by Major Moss ("Riot Duty," Page 26): "A direct attack (on a house) should never be made if it can be

avoided, but if made the interior defenses should first be destroyed by artillery fire."

189. Attacking an Unfortified House.—It is far more likely that the local defense unit will have occasion to pursue a single criminal, or a small group of them, into a house which has been used as a place of refuge, or to make an arrest indoors. In such cases rapidity of attack is all-important; once begun, the advance should never be allowed to stop. The first step is to surround the house, keeping careful watch on every possible point of egress. If the roof can be reached, either from adjoining roofs or by ladders, the attack should begin at the top and work down. In a large building, the attacking party should be careful not to scatter, but should operate as a unit. Two or three good axes may prove of great value if locked doors are encountered. If the house is isolated, or cannot be approached with good cover, sharpshooters should protect the advance, watching every window from which a shot could be fired. When the entrance must be made from below, it is often advisable for the attacking party not to wait to investigate the downstairs rooms, but to proceed at once to the attic or roof, and then work down floor by floor.

190. Police and Fire Departments.—The best authorities on the minor forms of interior duty are the members of the local police and fire departments. They are called on daily to face very similar situations, and they are necessarily familiar with every detail of local housing conditions. The commander of a local defense unit can-

not do better than devote a session or two of his officers' and noncommissioned officers' schools to these problems of interior tactics, and have the sessions conducted by experienced and intelligent police and fire department officers.

V

DRILL

191. **Physical Training.**—The most conspicuous defect in the training of the usual local defense unit is its neglect of the men's physical development. The ordinary business or professional man, even if he plays his eighteen holes of golf once or twice a week, is in no condition to undergo the fatigues and hardships which active service may at any time entail; two blocks of double time will leave half the company gasping for breath. While many other things are important, one, at least, is absolutely essential: the men must be put and kept in the best possible physical shape. It is, of course, impossible to prescribe rules whereby a unit drilling one or two evenings a week can accomplish this, but certain points may be insisted on. (1) Every drill period should include setting-up exercises. The company officers, under the direction of the staff surgeon, should carefully study the Manual of Physical Training, and lay out a progressive course of exercises for drill. (2) All drills should be conducted, so far as possible, in the open air (see Paragraph 38). (3) The officers should formulate a program of simple exercises which each man can go through daily at home, and should do everything in their power to induce their men to practice these exer-

cises regularly. (4) Drill with rifles should have as an important feature the rifle exercises which teach men to "become accustomed to the weight of the piece and to wield it with that 'handiness' so essential to its successful use." (5) The staff surgeon and hospital sergeants attached to the companies should make special efforts to advise men individually as to their needs and the best ways for them to develop their muscles and strengthen themselves generally. If the officers lay sufficient emphasis on the importance of being in good physical condition, the men are likely to respond with energy and enthusiasm.

192. Close Order Drill.—Close order drill, as too often practiced in local defense units, is both a bore and of relatively little value. Men march round and round, in an endless repetition of *Squads right* and *Squads left*, without receiving any immediate and specific instruction as to their errors. The whole meaning of close order drill is thus lost sight of. The essential feature is to *do the thing right*. The movements, after all, are few and simple, and the men will learn them if they are properly taught and constantly kept up to the mark. No slackness in close order drill should ever be tolerated. The company officers should be sure that all their noncommissioned officers are competent drillmasters—a few vigorous sessions of noncommissioned officers' school will accomplish wonders in this respect—and then should see that they drill their squads and sections thoroughly. Too many company commanders, eager to spend the time on company movements, pay far too little attention to

squad drill; or else, not trusting their noncommissioned officers, they attempt to teach the School of the Soldier to the assembled company. The periods of close order drill may be made relatively short, but while they last they should be thorough, with absolutely strict discipline. The men should be made fully to understand the purpose of this sort of drill, and its relation to field service; they should be taught that precision, accuracy and smartness of drill are absolutely essential to the making of efficient field units. If the noncommissioned officers are given the proper opportunity to drill their commands, they are far more likely to prove real leaders when the critical time comes; for this reason, as well as for facility of individual instruction, squad and section close order drill are of very great importance.

193. **Manual of the Riot Stick.**—In addition to the Manual of Arms as prescribed in Infantry Drill Regulations, it is desirable to have some form of manual which can be executed with the riot stick when the company is assembled. The following manual, prepared by Captain Edward Karow, 13th Battalion, M. H. G., is recommended:

General Rules:

Any position in the Manual of the Riot Stick, except the Riot Stick Salute, may be assumed from any other position in one count, except as indicated in the Present Arms for officers.

To grasp the riot stick, place the right hand through the thong so that the loop embraces all four fingers but excludes the thumb. For the long grip twist the thumb

twice around both strands of the thong and grasp the stick at its lower end or grip. In all positions of the Manual the long grip is used. To take the short grip, place the right hand in the thong as described above, with the thumb outside the loop, then turn the hand so as to wrap both strands of the thong around it once, and grasp the riot stick at or near the thong hole. This position is ordinarily used in actual riot service.

Position of Carry Arms.

With the right arm hanging nearly extended, hand by the side, elbow back, the grip of the riot stick is held between the thumb and the first two fingers of the right hand, with the third and fourth fingers back of the grip. The riot stick is thus held as though it were a pen. The upper end or point of the stick rests against the shoulder.

This is the normal position of the riot stick when standing or marching at Attention, unless otherwise ordered.

1. ORDER, 2. Arms.

Drop the point of the riot stick directly to the front, point about 6 inches in front of the line of toes, thumb extended along the grip and to the front. The stick is in a plane perpendicular to the front.

1. PORT, 2. Arms.

With the right hand throw the riot stick diagonally across the body; grasp it smartly with both hands, fingers and thumb around the stick; the right palm down at the grip; the left palm up at the center; stick sloping to the left and crossing opposite the juncture of the neck with the left shoulder; right forearm horizontal; left forearm

resting against the body; the stick in a vertical plane parallel to the front.

1. PARADE, 2. Rest.

Drop the point of the riot stick to the front. Take the position of Parade Rest as described in the School of the Soldier, except that the right hand grasps the grip with thumb extended along the left, and the left hand is uppermost and rests on the right hand. The stick is in front of the center of the body, in a plane perpendicular to the front, the point on a line with the left toe. At the command Attention, assume the position of Carry Arms.

1. PRESENT, 2. Arms.

Officers, at the command Present, and enlisted men, at the command Arms, raise and carry the riot stick to the front. Lower end of the grip at the height of the chin and 6 inches in front of the neck; point 6 inches farther to the front; the riot stick in a plane perpendicular to the front; fingers around the grip, thumb extended along the grip and to the right. Officers, at the command Arms, lower the riot stick with point in prolongation of the right foot; hand by the side; thumb extended along the right of the grip. Enlisted men do not execute the second position of Present Arms.

1. RIOT STICK, 2. Salute.

Officers execute the first position of Present Arms. Enlisted men take the position of Carry Arms, carry the left hand smartly to the riot stick at the height of the chest, forearm horizontal, palm of hand down, thumb and fingers extended and joined, forefinger touching the

riot stick, and look towards the person saluted. (Two) Officers execute the second position of Present Arms. Enlisted men drop the left hand by the side, turn head and eyes to the front.

194. **The Riot Stick in Service.**—All officers and enlisted men should have frequent drills in the management of the riot stick, for much of its effectiveness in service depends on its proper handling. The best guide for this drill is "Single Stick Drill," by W. J. Cromie, Instructor in Gymnastics, University of Pennsylvania (Spalding Athletic Library). The guards, moulinets and cuts therein described and illustrated should be thoroughly taught, and then practiced by the men, working in pairs. To these movements should be added the thrust, a short, sharp jab aimed always at the opponent's stomach or ribs, and followed by a very quick recovery to the "On Guard" position. When on active service, the men should be taught never to threaten a cut, as distinct from a thrust, unless they are fully prepared to deliver it. In cases of unwillingness or stubbornness rather than actual violence, the thrust is far better than the cut. The thrust should never be aimed at the opponent's face. It may be delivered with any degree of force that circumstances warrant, but the cut, if delivered at all, should be hard. Cuts aimed at the body are seldom effective; the proper aiming points are the head and—against a man armed with any sort of missile or weapon—the wrists. The "thigh cuts" demonstrated in Mr. Cromie's handbook may readily be adapted to cuts aimed at the wrists. The men should likewise be

trained, by actual practice, in resisting attempts to wrest their riot sticks away from them.

195. Interior Guard Duty.—All officers and enlisted men should be drilled, as far as time and opportunity permit, in the details of interior guard duty. The men should be fully instructed in the ordinary duties of sentries, and the squad leaders and sergeants should have frequent practice in handling guard details. An informal guard mount is an excellent feature for every drill, particularly if sentries are to be posted to guard the company's automobiles; formal guard mount should be held often enough to familiarize the officers with their duties in connection therewith.

196. Crowd Tactics.—Drill in the special formations pertaining to crowd tactics should be frequent and vigorous. The formations themselves (see Paragraphs 103–120) may be learned in the drill hall, and should all be practiced from a halt and from the march at both quick and double time. Their uses should, whenever possible, be practiced on the streets, in freight yards, or in any similar places where they might be used on active service. As soon as the men are fairly proficient in assuming the formations, actual problems should be set before them: a street to clear, an arrest to make, a building to guard, and so on. The formations should frequently be used against resistance (see Paragraph 121).

197. Signal Drill.—All officers and enlisted men should be drilled in the use of the prescribed arm signals, including those enumerated in Paragraph 129. In addition, each company should train as many men as possible in

the use of the General Service (International) and American Morse codes, and in the two-arm semaphore signal system. The prescribed bugle signals (Infantry Drill Regulations, Paragraph 41 and Pages 207-208) should be frequently employed, and the routine bugle calls should be used enough to render all the men thoroughly familiar with them. The company mechanics should be specially instructed in the installation and use of field telegraphs and telephones (see Paragraph 61).

198. First Aid.—Every officer and enlisted man should receive special training in first aid, under the direction of the staff surgeon and the hospital sergeants and orderlies. The noncommissioned officers, in particular, should be required to demonstrate their familiarity with the methods of emergency treatment of wounds and injuries.

199. Rifle Drill.—In addition to the manual of arms, and the exercises mentioned in Paragraph 191, drill with rifles should include a considerable amount of bayonet practice. In this the new method should be used exclusively, in order that the men may not later have to unlearn positions and motions based on the old and now discredited principles. As guides to the new method, S. F. Mashbir's "Ten Lessons in Bayonet Fighting," the recently issued "Bayonet Training and Practical Bayonet Fighting," and the "Notes on Bayonet Training" issued by the Army War College (No. 1, March, 1917; No. 2, August, 1917) may profitably be used. The drill with rifles should likewise include as much of the aiming and position work as time permits (Small Arms Firing Manual, Paragraphs 13-61). Each man should


make his triangle of sighting (S. A. F. M., Paragraph 27) as a preliminary test of his ability to use a rifle at all under service conditions.

200. Rifle and Pistol Practice.—The amount of rifle and pistol practice possible will depend on the availability of suitable ranges and the quantity of ammunition which can be used (see Paragraphs 39 and 51). The essential thing is to give every man enough pistol practice so that he is really familiar with the use of the weapon on which, in an emergency, his life may depend. Pistol practice should be conducted under the close supervision of the company officers, and thorough instruction in the proper method of holding and aiming the weapon should be given. If a rifle gallery and suitable ammunition (reduced charges) are available, the company riflemen (see Paragraph 51) should have frequent practice, after allowing for which as many as possible of the other men should be given gallery rifle training. The rifle and shotgun men should be given special drills in the open, with particular reference to the selection of good fire positions and the use of cover.

201. Twofold Function of Drill.—It should never be forgotten that the local defense unit has a double purpose: to preserve peace and order within its own community, and to train material for the National Army (see Paragraphs 1-3). Every drill should be conducted with both functions clearly in mind; the men should be taught to be soldiers, for the time being, both because discipline and drill are essential to effective local defense, and because they are the first lessons to be learned in case the

far greater service is later to be undertaken. Thus work which has no direct place in local defense, but which is an important part of Army training, may properly be included in the drill and instruction program of the local defense unit. Officers and enlisted men who have special enthusiasm for military science, who hope to enter the Federal service as volunteers, or who are within the provisions of the draft law, may profitably devote additional time to the study of applied minor tactics, map reading and map making, military hygiene and sanitation, company field training, trench warfare, field artillery matériel and tactics, army paperwork, military law, and any others of the scores of subjects concerning which the Army officer of to-day should be informed.

202. Text and Reference Books.—The following list of text-books, manuals and reference books is given, not as in any sense indicating a complete military library, but simply to point out some of the most useful guides for the officers and enlisted men of any local defense unit. The books listed may be ordered through any local bookseller, or through the United States Infantry Association, 814 Seventeenth Street, Washington, D. C. The following abbreviations are used to indicate the publishers of the largest number of military text-books: M, National Military Publishing Company, 1919 Broadway, New York City; B, George Banta Publishing Company, Menasha, Wisconsin; S, Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; G, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. The prices here given are according to recent lists, but cannot be guaranteed.



GENERAL DRILL AND MILITARY INSTRUCTION

Infantry Drill Regulations (M); 50 cents. (The fundamental text-book, a copy of which should be in every man's possession.)

Manual of Interior Guard Duty (M); 50 cents.

The Cantonment Manual, by W. G. Kilner and A. J. MacElroy; \$1.00. (The most convenient compendium of essential material from the various manuals.)

The Plattsburg Manual, by O. O. Ellis and E. B. Garey; \$2.00. (The most lucid drill manual for recruits.)

Manual of Military Training, by James A. Moss (B); \$2.25. (The standard and most complete summary of general information regarding the elements of military training.)

Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry of the Organized Militia and Volunteers of the United States (M); 50 cents.

Riot Duty, by James A. Moss (B); 50 cents. (The standard text-book for mob tactics; see Paragraph 180.)

Noncommissioned Officers' Manual, by James A. Moss (B); \$1.50.

Infantry Training, by D. F. McDonald (B); \$1.00.

Customs of the Service, by Charles Miller (S); 15 cents.

The Soldier's Guide, by J. M. Hutchinson (M); \$1.25.

- Military Character, Habit, Deportment, Courtesy and Discipline, by M. B. Stewart (B); 50 cents.
- Complete United States Infantry Guide, by C. M. Tobin and J. K. Parsons; \$5.00. (The most detailed and inclusive summary of the entire subject.)
- Police Reserve and Home Defense Guard Manual, by W. A. Dawkins and C. F. Cahalane; \$1.00. (Contains much useful information for the policeman on his beat, but nothing regarding organization or tactics for crowd or riot duty.)
- Self-Helps for the Citizen Soldier, by James A. Moss (B); \$1.25.
- Privates' Manual, by James A. Moss (B); \$1.00.
- What Sammy's Doing, by James A. Moss and W. H. Waldron (B); 75 cents.
- Selective Service Manual, by A. L. James, Jr.; 50 cents.
- Army and Navy Uniforms and Insignia, by Dion Williams; \$1.25.
- Do's and Don't's in the Army, by Harold Hersey; 50 cents.
- Quick Training for War, by Sir Robert Baden-Powell; 50 cents.
- Our Military History, by Leonard Wood; \$1.00.

MANUALS FOR OFFICERS

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
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
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